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Abstract
Aggregating preferences over combinatorial domains has many applications in artificial intelligence (AI).
Given the inherent exponential nature of preferences over combinatorial domains, compact representation
languages are needed to represent them, and (m)CP-nets are among the most studied ones. Sequential
and global voting are two different ways of aggregating preferences represented via CP-nets. In sequential
voting, agents’ preferences are aggregated feature-by-feature. For this reason, sequential voting may exhibit
voting paradoxes, i.e., the possibility to select sub-optimal outcomes when preferences have specific feature
dependencies. To avoid paradoxes in sequential voting, one has often assumed the (quite) restrictive constraint
of O-legality, which imposes a shared common topological order among all the agents’ CP-nets. On the
contrary, in global voting, CP-nets are considered as a whole during the preference aggregation process. For
this reason, global voting is immune from paradoxes, and hence there is no need to impose restrictions over
the CP-nets’ structure when preferences are aggregated via global voting. Sequential voting over O-legal
CP-nets has extensively been investigated, and O-legality of CP-nets has often been required in other studies.
On the other hand, global voting over non-O-legal CP-nets has not carefully been analyzed, despite it was
explicitly stated in the literature that a theoretical comparison between global and sequential voting was
highly promising and a precise complexity analysis for global voting has been asked for multiple times. In
quite few works, only very partial results on the complexity of global voting over CP-nets have been given.
In this paper, we start to fill this gap by carrying out a thorough computational complexity analysis of
global voting tasks, for Pareto and majority voting, over not necessarily O-legal acyclic binary polynomially
connected (m)CP-nets. We show that all these problems belong to various levels of the polynomial hierarchy,
and some of them are even in P or LOGSPACE. Our results are a notable achievement, given that the
previously known upper bound for most of these problems was the complexity class EXPTIME. We provide
various exact complexity results showing tight lower bounds and matching upper bounds for problems that
(up to date) did not have any explicit non-obvious lower bound.
1 Introduction
The problem of managing and aggregating agent preferences has attracted extensive interest in the computer
science community [17], because methods for representing and reasoning about preferences are very important in
artificial intelligence (AI) applications, such as recommender systems [63], (group) product configuration [11,
24, 70], (group) planning [10, 65, 66, 69], (group) preference-based constraint satisfaction [5, 9, 14], and (group)
preference-based query answering/information retrieval [6, 23, 56, 57].
In computer science, the study of preference aggregation has often been based on the solid ground of social
choice theory, which is the branch of economics analyzing methods for collective decision making [2, 3]. Having
a well-founded theory and practice on how to properly and efficiently manage and aggregate preferences of real
software agents, and hence support the growth and use of these technologies, has been one of the main drivers
for investigating social choice theory from a computational perspective. In social choice theory, the actual ways
of representing agent preferences are rarely taken into consideration, also because the sets of candidates usually
considered are relatively small in size. For this reason, most of the insights obtained in the computational social
choice literature about the computational properties of preference aggregation functions (or voting procedures)
have assumed that agent preferences over the set of candidates are extensively listed (see [17] and references
therein). Although this is perfectly reasonable when we reason about, e.g., (political) elections among a not
too numerous set of human candidates, this is not feasible when the voting domain (i.e., the set of candidates)
∗Preliminary results of this paper have appeared in the Proceedings of the 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI-16) [54].
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(a) A CP-net modeling dinner preferences. (b) The CP-net’s extended preferencegraph.
Figure 1: A CP-net and its preference graph.
has a combinatorial structure [18, 45, 48]. By combinatorial structure, we mean that the set of candidates (or
outcomes) is the Cartesian product of finite value domains for each of a set of features (also called variables, or
issues, or attributes). The problem of aggregating agents’ preferences over combinatorial domains (or multi-issue
domains) is called a combinatorial vote [44, 45].
Interestingly, voting over combinatorial domains is rather common. For example, in 2012, on the day of the
US presidential election, voters in California had to vote also for eleven referenda [48]. As another example,
it may be the case that the inhabitants of a town have to make a joint decision about different related issues
regarding their community, which could be whether and where to build new public facilities (such as a swimming
pool or a library), or whether to levy new taxes. Note that these voting scenarios are often also called multiple
elections or multiple referenda [15, 18, 47, 48, 75, 78]. Other examples are group product configurations and
group planning [48, 70]. As for the latter, consider, e.g., a situation in which multiple autonomous agents have to
agree upon a shared plan of actions to reach a goal that is preferred by the group as a whole, such as a group of
autonomous robots coordinating during the exploration of a remote area/planet. Each robot has a specific task
to accomplish, and the group as a whole coordinates to achieve a common goal. That is, the robots have their
own specific preferences over a vast amount of variables/features emerging from the contingency of the situation
to complete their individual tasks, however, their individual preferences have to be blended in all together, so
that the course of action of a robotic agent does not interfere with the tasks of the other agents, and the overall
mission is successful. These examples show the great relevance of dealing with combinatorial votes, and hence
the pressing necessity of finding ways to represent agent preferences over multi-issue domains and algorithms for
aggregating them.
Combinatorial domains contain an exponential number of outcomes in the number of features, and hence
compact representations for combinatorial preferences are needed [45, 48] (see also Section 6.1 for more back-
ground). The graphical model of CP-nets [8] is among the most studied of these representations, as proven by a
vast literature on them. In CP-nets, the vertices of a graph represent features, and an edge from vertex A to
vertex B models the influence of the value of feature A on the choice of the value of feature B. Intuitively, this
model captures preferences like “if the rest of the dinner is the same, with a fish dish (A’s value), I prefer a white
wine (B’s value)”, also called conditional ceteris paribus preferences; a more detailed example is given below.
Example 1.1. Assume that we want to model one’s preferences for a dinner with a main dish and a wine.
In the CP-net in Figure 1a, an edge from vertex Main to vertex Wine models that the value of feature Main
influences the choice of the value of feature Wine. More precisely, m and f are the possible values of feature
Main, and they denote “meat” and “f ish”, respectively, while r and w are the possible values of feature Wine,
and they denote “red (wine)” and “white (wine)”, respectively. The table associated with feature Wine specifies
that when a meat dish is chosen, then a red wine is preferred to a white one, and when a fish main is chosen,
then a white wine is preferred to a red wine. The table associated with feature Main indicates that a meat
dish is preferred to a fish one. These tables are called CP tables. A CP-net like this one can represent the
above conditional ceteris paribus preference “given that the rest of the dinner does not change, with a meat dish
(Main’s value), I prefer a red wine (Wine’s value)”.
Every CP-net has an associated extended preference graph, whose vertices are all the possible outcomes of
the domain, and whose edges connect outcomes differing on only one value. More precisely, there is a directed
edge from an outcome to another, if the latter is preferred to the former according to the preferences encoded in
the tables of the CP-net. Figure 1b shows the extended preference graph of the CP-net in Figure 1a, having as
vertices all the possible combinations for the dinner, and there is, e.g., an edge from mw to mr , because the
combination meat and red wine is preferred to the combination meat and white wine. The preferences encoded
in a CP-net are the transitive closure of its extended preference graph. Intuitively, an outcome α is preferred to
an outcome β according to the preferences of a CP-net, if there is a directed path from β to α in the extended
preference graph. C
CP-nets are also used to model preferences of groups of individuals, obtaining a multi-agent model, called
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Figure 2: Dinner preferences of Alice, Bob, and Chuck (in this order) modeled via CP-nets (above) and their
extended preference graphs (below).
mCP-nets [64], which is a set, or profile, of CP-nets, one for each agent. The preference semantics of mCP-nets
is defined via voting schemes: through its own individual CP-net, every agent votes whether an outcome is
preferred to another. Various voting schemes were proposed for mCP-nets [52, 64], and different voting schemes
give rise to different dominance semantics for mCP-nets. In this paper, we consider Pareto and majority voting
as they were defined in [64]. In the voting schemes proposed for mCP-nets, the voting protocol adopted, i.e., the
actual way in which votes are collected [19], is global voting [46, 48]. In this protocol, the results of the voting
procedure are computed by having as input the CP-nets as a whole (see Section 6.2 for related works on different
voting protocols over CP-nets).
Example 1.2. Consider again the dinner scenario, and assume that there are three agents (Alice, Bob, and
Chuck), expressing their preferences via CP-nets (see Figure 2). In Pareto voting, an outcome α dominates
an outcome β, if all agents prefers α to β. In majority voting, an outcome α dominates an outcome β, if the
majority of agents prefers α to β.
The outcome fr is not Pareto optimal, because there is an outcome (namely mr), which is preferred to fr by
all the agents. The outcome mw, instead, is Pareto optimal, because there is no outcome Pareto dominating mw.
Hence, from a Pareto perspective, mw is better than fr . The outcome mw, however, is not majority optimal,
because mr majority dominates mw (Alice and Chuck prefer mr to mw). On the other hand, mr is majority
optimal, because there is no outcome majority dominating mr. Hence, from a majority perspective, mr is better
than mw. Moreover, again according to the majority voting scheme, mr is a very good outcome, because mr is
also majority optimum, which means that mr majority dominates all other outcomes. On the contrary, in this
example, there is no Pareto optimum outcome, i.e., there is no outcome Pareto dominating all other outcomes.C
In the literature, a comparison between sequential voting (which is another voting protocol; see Section 6.2)
and global voting over CP-nets was explicitly asked for and stated to be highly promising [46]. However, global
voting over CP-nets has not been as thoroughly investigated as sequential voting. In fact, unlike CP-nets, which
were extensively analyzed, a precise complexity analysis of mCP-nets has been missing for a long time, as
explicitly mentioned several times in the literature [46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 67]—since the dominance semantics for
mCP-nets is global voting over CP-nets, in the following, we use them interchangeably. Furthermore, it was
conjectured that the complexity of computing majority optimal and majority optimum outcomes in mCP-nets is
harder than NP and co-NP [49, 51].
Contributions The aim of this paper is to explore the complexity of mCP-nets (and hence of global voting
over CP-nets). In particular, we focus on acyclic binary polynomially connected mCP-nets (see Section 2 for
these notions) built with standard CP-nets, i.e., the constituent CP-nets of an mCP-net rank all the features,
and they are not partial CP-nets (which instead were allowed in the original definition of mCP-nets [64]). Unlike
what is often assumed in the literature, in this work, we do not restrict the profiles of CP-nets to be O-legal
(which means that there is a topological order common to all the CP-nets of the profile; see Section 6.3). We
carry out a thorough complexity analysis for the (a) Pareto and (b) majority voting schemes, as defined in [64],
of deciding (1) dominance, (2) optimal and (3) optimum outcomes, and (4) the existence of optimal and (5)
optimum outcomes. Deciding the dominance for a voting scheme s means deciding, given two outcomes, whether
one dominates the other according to s. Deciding whether an outcome is optimal or optimum for a voting scheme
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Problem Complexity
Pa
re
to
Pareto-Dominance NP-complete
Is-Pareto-Optimal co-NP-complete
Exists-Pareto-Optimal Θ(1)*
Is-Pareto-Optimum in LOGSPACE
Exists-Pareto-Optimum in P
M
aj
or
it
y Majority-Dominance NP-complete
Is-Majority-Optimal co-NP-complete
Exists-Majority-Optimal ΣP2 -complete
Is-Majority-Optimum ΠP2 -complete
Exists-Majority-Optimum ΠP2 -hard, in DP2
Figure 3: Summary of the complexity results obtained in this paper for global voting over CP-nets. Membership
results above P are valid for any representation scheme whose dominance test is feasible in NP. *A different
proof is available in [64].
s means deciding whether the outcome is not dominated or dominates all others, respectively, according to s.
Deciding the existence of optimal and optimum outcomes is the natural extension of the previous problems.
A summary of the complexity results obtained in this paper is provided in Figure 3. More precisely, deciding
dominance and optimal outcomes is complete for NP and co-NP, respectively, for both Pareto and majority voting,
while deciding the existence of optimal outcomes can be done in constant time for Pareto voting and is complete
for ΣP2 for majority voting. Furthermore, deciding optimum outcomes and their existence is in LOGSPACE and
P for Pareto voting, and complete for ΠP2 and between ΠP2 and DP2 for majority voting, respectively.
It thus turns out that Pareto voting is the easiest voting scheme to evaluate among the two analyzed here.
More precisely, both Pareto and majority dominance are NP-complete, however, only the complexity of majority
dominance carries over to deciding optimal and optimum outcomes and their existence, and causes a substantial
increase of their complexity, e.g., deciding the existence of majority optimal and optimum outcomes is hard
for ΣP2 and ΠP2 , respectively. This is due to the fact that majority voting is structurally more complex than
Pareto voting. Intuitively, Pareto voting is based on unanimity, hence, to disprove Pareto dominance between
two outcomes, it suffices to find one agent that does not agree with the dominance relationship. This particular
structure of Pareto voting makes the other tasks not more difficult than the dominance test or even tractable.
Our results hence prove the conjecture posed in [49, 51] about majority voting tasks over (m)CP-nets being
harder than NP and co-NP.
We show completeness results for most cases, and we provide tight lower bounds for problems that (up to
date) did not have any explicit lower bound transcending the obvious hardness due to the dominance test over
the underlying CP-nets. Many of our results are intractability results, where the problems are put at various
levels of the polynomial hierarchy. However, although intractability is usually “bad” news, these results are quite
interesting, as for most of these tasks, only EXPTIME upper bounds were known in the literature to date [64].
Even more interestingly, some of these problems are actually tractable, as they are in P or even LOGSPACE,
which is a huge leap from EXPTIME.
Our hardness results are given for binary acyclic polynomially connected (m)CP-nets. This means that our
hardness results extend to classes of (m)CP-nets encompassing the CP-nets considered here, and in particular
also to general mCP-nets with partial CP-nets or multi-valued features. More generally, the hardness results
proven here extend to any representation scheme as “expressive and succinct” as the class of CP-nets used
in the proofs (see Section 2.5). Moreover, the membership results above P that we prove here extend to any
“NP-representation” scheme (see Section 2.5). Our hardness results on the existence of optimal and optimum
outcomes provide also lower bounds for the computational problems. Indeed, actually computing optimal or
optimum outcomes cannot be easier than the bounds shown here, because otherwise it would be possible to
decide their existence more efficiently.
Organization of the paper The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some prelimi-
naries. In Section 3, we prove some basic complexity results for CP-nets. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the complexity
of Pareto and majority voting, respectively: first, we analyze the complexity of dominance testing; then, we
study the complexity of deciding whether an outcome is optimal and whether there exists an optimal outcome;
and we conclude by dealing with the complexity of deciding whether an outcome is optimum and whether there
exists an optimum outcome. In Section 6, we discuss related works. Section 7 summarizes the main results and
gives an outlook on future research. For several results, we give only proof sketches in the body of the paper,
while detailed proofs are provided in Appendix A.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we give some preliminaries, briefly recalling from the literature preference relations and aggregation,
conditional preference nets (CP-nets), CP-nets for groups of m agents (mCP-nets), and the complexity classes
that we will encounter in our complexity results. We also define a formal framework for preference representation
schemes, because our membership results will be given for generic representations whose dominance test is
feasible in NP.
2.1 Preference relations and aggregation
Before dwelling upon the details of CP-nets, which is the specific preference representation analyzed in this
paper, we now give an introductory overview of the general concepts of preferences and their aggregation.
In this paper, a preference relation R over a set of outcomes O is a strict order over O, i.e., R is a binary
relation over O that is irreflexive (i.e., 〈α, α〉 /∈ R), asymmetric (i.e., if 〈α, β〉 ∈ R, then 〈β, α〉 /∈ R), and
transitive (i.e., if 〈α, β〉 ∈ R and 〈β, γ〉 ∈ R, then 〈α, γ〉 ∈ R). A preference ranking R is a preference relation
that is total (i.e., either 〈α, β〉 ∈ R or 〈β, α〉 ∈ R for any two different outcomes α and β). Usually, given
two outcomes α and β, their preference relationship stated in R is denoted by α R β, instead of 〈α, β〉 ∈ R,
which means that, in R, α is strictly preferred to β, or α dominates β. On the other hand, α 6R β means that
〈α, β〉 /∈ R, and α ./R means that 〈α, β〉 /∈ R and 〈β, α〉 /∈ R, i.e., α and β are incomparable in R. Observe that
in a preference ranking, it cannot be the case that two outcomes are incomparable. Given a preference relation
R, an outcome α is optimal in R if there is no outcome β such that β R α. We say that α is optimum in R, if
for all outcomes β such that β 6= α, it holds that α R β. Clearly, if there is an optimum outcome in R, then it
is unique. For notational convenience, if the preference relation R is clear from the context, we do not explicitly
mention R as a subscript in the notations above. In the following, if not stated otherwise, when we speak of
preferences structures, we mean preference relations.
In preference aggregation, we deal with preferences of multiple agents. A preference profileP = 〈R1, . . . ,Rm〉
is a set of m preference relations. We assume that all the preferences Ri of P are defined over the same set
of outcomes, i.e., the agents express their preferences over the same set of candidates. In this paper, we focus
on voting procedures based on comparisons of pairs of outcomes (see, e.g., [4] for a classification of different
kinds of preference aggregation procedures). For this reason, we need to define the following sets of agents.
For a profile P = 〈R1, . . . ,Rm〉, we denote by SP(α, β) = {i | α Ri β}, S≺P(α, β) = {i | α ≺Ri β}, and
S./P(α, β) = {i | α ./Ri β}, the sets of agents preferring α to β, preferring β to α, and for which α and β are
incomparable, respectively.
The voting schemes considered in this paper are Pareto and majority. The definition of their dominance
semantics over preference profiles, reported below, is a generalization of the respective definition over mCP-nets
given in [64].
Pareto: An outcome β Pareto dominates an outcome α, denoted β pP α, if all agents prefer β to α, i.e.,
|SP(β, α)| = m.
Majority An outcome β majority dominates an outcome α, denoted β majP α, if the majority of the agents
prefer β to α, i.e., |SP(β, α)| > |S≺P(β, α)|+ |S./P(β, α)|.
For a preference profile P and a voting scheme s, if outcome β does not s dominate outcome α, we denote
this by β 6sP α. An outcome α is s optimal in P, if for all β 6= α, it holds that β 6sP α, while α is s optimum
in P, if for all β 6= α, it holds that α sP β. Note that optimum outcomes, if they exist, are unique.
2.2 CP-nets
We now focus on CP-nets, which is the preference representation that we will more closely investigate in this work.
As mentioned in the introduction, the set of outcomes of a preference relation is often defined as the Cartesian
product of finite value domains for each of a set of features. Conditional preference nets (CP-nets) [8] are a
formalism to encode conditional ceteris paribus preferences over such combinatorial domains. The distinctive
element of CP-nets is that a directed graph, whose vertices represent the features of a combinatorial domain, is
used to intuitively model the conditional part of conditional ceteris paribus preference statements. Below, we
recall the syntax, semantics, and some properties of CP-nets; see Section 6.1 for more on conditional ceteris
paribus preferences and preference representations in general.
Syntax of CP-nets A CP-net N is a triple 〈GN ,DomN , (CPTFN )F∈FN 〉, where GN = 〈FN , EN 〉 is a directed
graph whose vertices FN represent the features of a combinatorial domain, and DomN and (CPTFN )F∈FN are
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a function and a family of functions, respectively. The function DomN associates a (value) domain DomN (F )
with every feature F , while the functions CPTFN are the CP tables for every feature F , which are defined below.
The value domain of a feature F is the set of all values that F may assume in the possible outcomes. In this
paper, we assume features to be binary, i.e., the domain of each feature F contains exactly two values, usually
denoted f and f , and called the overlined and the non-overlined value (of F ), respectively. For a set of features
S, DomN (S) = ×F∈SDomN (F ) denotes the Cartesian product of the domains of the features in S. Thus, an
outcome is an element of ON = DomN (FN ). Given a feature F and an outcome α, we denote by α[F ] the
value of F in α, while, given a set of features F , α[F ] is the projection of α over F . For two outcomes α and
β, and a set of features F , we denote by α[F ] = β[F ] that α[F ] = β[F ] for all F ∈ F ; we write α[F ] 6= β[F ],
when this is not the case, i.e., when there is at least one feature F ∈ F such that α[F ] 6= β[F ]. The CP tables
encode preferences over feature values. Intuitively, the CP table of a feature F specifies how the values of the
parent features of F influence the preferences over the values of F . More formally, for a feature F , we denote by
ParN (F ) = {G ∈ FN | 〈G,F 〉 ∈ EN} the set of all features in GN from which there is an edge to F . We call
ParN (F ) the set of the parents of F (in N ). We denote by OrdN (F ) the set of all the (strict) preference rankings
over the elements of DomN (F ). Each function CPTFN : DomN (ParN (F )) → OrdN (F ) maps every element of
DomN (ParN (F )) to a (strict) preference ranking over the domain of F . If ParN (F ) =∅, then CPTFN is a single
(strict) preference ranking over DomN (F ). Note that indifferences between feature values are not admitted in
(classical) CP-nets. Each function CPTFN is represented via a two-column table, in which, given a row, the
element in the first column is the input value of the function CPTFN , and the element in the second column is
the associated (strict) preference ranking over DomN (F ). Since CPTFN is total, in the table representing the
function, there is a row for any combination of values of the parent features, i.e., for a feature F , there are
2|DomN (ParN (F ))| rows in the table of F .
In the following, when we define CP tables, we often use a logical notation to identify for which specific
values of the parent features, a particular row in the CP table has to be considered. Although this is the notation
on which generalized propositional CP-nets [27] are based on, it is used here only for notational convenience. In
this paper, we always assume that CP tables are explicitly represented in the input instances. In the CP tables,
f  f denotes f being preferred to f . We denote by ‖N‖ the size of CP-net N , i.e., the space in terms of bits
required to represent the whole net N (which includes features, edges, feature domains, and CP tables).
Semantics of CP-nets The preference semantics of CP-nets can be defined in several different but equivalent
ways [8]. A first definition has a model-theoretic flavour [8, Definitions 2 and 3]. Intuitively, a preference
ranking R violates a CP-net N , if there are two outcomes α and β that according to the CP tables of N
should be ranked β  α, but they are not ranked in such a way in R (i.e., α R β, since R is total). Formally,
a preference ranking R violates a CP-net N , if there are two distinct outcomes α, β and a feature F such
that α[FN \ {F}] = β[FN \ {F}] (i.e., α and β differ only on the value of F ), β[F ]  α[F ] in the order
CPTFN (α[ParN (F )]), and α R β. A preference ranking R satisfies a CP-net N , if R does not violate N . Given
two outcomes α and β, a CP-net N entails the preference α  β, denoted N |= α  β, if α R β for every
preference ranking R over ON that satisfies N . The preference semantics of CP-nets can be equivalently defined
via the concept of improving (or alternatively worsening) flip [8, Definition 4]: let F be a feature, and let α be
an outcome. Intuitively, flipping the value of F in α from α[F ] to a different one is an improving flip, if the new
value of F is preferred, given the values in α of the parent features of F . More formally, flipping F from α[F ] to
a different value f ′ is an improving flip, if f ′  α[F ] holds in CPTFN (α[ParN (F )]). Given two outcomes α and β
differing only on the value of a feature F , there is an improving flip from α to β, denoted α −→N [F ] β, if flipping
the value of F from α[F ] to β[F ] is an improving flip. In the following, we often omit the feature F and simply
write α→N β; and when we say that we flip a feature, then we often mean that the flipping is improving. The
(extended) preference graph of N is the pair GN = 〈VN , EN 〉, where the nodes VN are all the possible outcomes
of N , and, given two outcomes α, β ∈ VN , the directed edge from α to β belongs to EN if and only if α→N β.
It can be shown that, for a CP-net N and two outcomes α and β, N |= β  α if and only if there is a sequence
of improving flips from α to β [8, Theorems 7 and 8]. Therefore, for an agent whose preferences are encoded
through a CP-net N , we say that the agent prefers β to α, or that β dominates α (in N ), denoted β N α, if N
entails β  α, or, equivalently, if there is an improving flipping sequence from α to β. If for two outcomes α and
β, neither α N β nor β N α, then α and β are incomparable (in N ), denoted α ./N β (which is equivalent to
the existence of preference rankings R1 and R2 that both satisfy N such that α R1 β and β R2 α).
Note here that, since there are no indifferences between features values in (classical) CP-nets, for any two
outcomes α and β, either one dominates the other, or they are incomparable.
Example 2.1. Consider the CP-net N shown in Figure 4. For the outcomes α = abc and β = abc, it holds
that β N α, because α −→N [A] β. For the outcomes α = abc and β = abc, it holds that β 6N α, because
there is no path from α to β in GN . However, α N β, because β −→N [C] α, and hence it is not the case that
α ./N β. Consider now the outcomes α = abc and β = abc. Then, β N α by the improving flipping sequence
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(a) A CP-net N with three features.
(b) The CP-net’s extended preference graph GN .
Figure 4: A CP-net and its extended preference graph.
abc→ abc→ abc→ abc. C
Properties of CP-nets A CP-net is binary, if all its features are binary. The indegree of a CP-net N is the
maximum number of edges entering in a node of the graph of N . A CP-net N is singly connected, if, for any two
distinct features G and F , there is at most one path from G to F in GN . A class F of CP-nets is polynomially
connected, if there exists a polynomial p such that, for any CP-net N ∈ F and for any two features G and F of
N , there are at most p(‖N‖) distinct paths from G to F in GN . A CP-net N is acyclic, if GN is acyclic. It is
well known that acyclic CP-nets N always have a preference ranking satisfying N , their extended preference
graph GN is acyclic, the preferences encoded by N are consistent (i.e., there is no outcome α such that α N α),
and there is a unique optimum outcome oN dominating all other outcomes (and, clearly, not dominated by any
other), which can be computed in polynomial time [8].
It is known that dominance testing, i.e., deciding, for any two given outcomes α and β, whether β  α, is
feasible in NP over polynomially connected classes of binary acyclic CP-nets [8]. However, it is an open problem
whether dominance testing is feasible in NP over non-polynomially-connected classes of binary acyclic CP-nets.
Also, the complexity of dominance testing for non-binary CP-nets is currently still open. Whereas dominance
testing for the class of acyclic binary singly connected CP-nets whose indegree is at most six is NP-hard [8]—we
improve this result in Section 3, requiring only indegree three. Dominance testing is feasible in polynomial
time on acyclic binary CP-nets whose graph is a tree or a polytree [8], and it is PSPACE-complete for cyclic
CP-nets [27].
In the rest of this paper, we consider only binary acyclic (and often polynomially connected) classes of
CP-nets. When the CP-net N is clear from the context, we often omit the subscript “N” from the notations
introduced above.
2.3 mCP-nets
In this section, we focus on mCP-nets [64], which are a formalism to reason about conditional ceteris paribus
preferences when a group of multiple agents is considered. Intuitively, an mCP-net is a profile of m (individual)
CP-nets, one for each agent of the group. The original definition of mCP-nets also allows for partial CP-nets.
Here, we consider only mCP-nets consisting of a collection of standard CP-nets. The difference is that we do not
allow for non-ranked features in agents’ CP-nets, and hence there is no distinction between private, shared, and
visible features (see [64] for definitions), i.e., all features are ranked in all the individual CP-nets of an mCP-net.
As underlined in [64], the “m” of anmCP-net stands for multiple agents and also indicates that the preferences
of m agents are modeled, so a 3CP-net is an mCP-net with m = 3. Formally, an mCP-netM = 〈N1, . . . ,Nm〉
consists of m CP-nets N1, . . . , Nm, all of them defined over the same set of features, which, in turn, have the
same domains. If M is an mCP-net, we denote by FM the set of all features of M, and by DomM(F ) the
domain of feature F inM. Given this notation, FNi = FM, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and DomNi (F ) = DomM(F ), for
all features F ∈ FM and all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Although the features of the individual CP-nets are the same, their
graphical structures may be different, i.e., the edges between the features in the various individual CP-nets may
vary. We underline here that, unlike in other papers in the literature, we do not impose that the individual
CP-nets of the agents share a common topological order (i.e., we do not restrict the profiles of CP-nets to be
O-legal); see Section 6 for more on O-legality.
An outcome for an mCP-net is an assignment to all the features of the CP-nets, and given an mCP-net
M, we denote by OM the set of all the outcomes in M. The preference semantics of mCP-nets is defined
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through global voting over CP-nets. In particular, via its own individual CP-net, each agent votes whether an
outcome dominates another, and hence different ways of collecting votes (i.e., different voting schemes) give
rise to different group dominance semantics for an mCP-net. Let M = 〈N1, . . . ,Nm〉 be an mCP-net, and
let α and β be two outcomes. With a notation similar to the one defined above, SM(α, β) = {i | α Ni β},
S≺M(α, β) = {i | α ≺Ni β}, and S./M(α, β) = {i | α ./Ni β} are the sets of the agents of M preferring α to β,
preferring β to α, and for which α and β are incomparable, respectively.
In [52, 64], various voting schemes were proposed and analyzed to define multi-agent dominance semantics
for mCP-nets. In this paper, we focus on two of them, namely, Pareto and majority voting, whose dominance
semantics definitions are the natural specializations to mCP-nets of Pareto and majority dominance semantics
defined above. Consider an mCP-netM = 〈N1 , . . . ,Nm〉, and let α and β be two outcomes. Then:
Pareto: β Pareto dominates α, denoted β pM α, if all the agents ofM prefer β to α, i.e., |SM(β, α)| = m.
Majority: β majority dominates α, denoted β majM α, if the majority of the agents ofM prefers β to α, i.e.,
|SM(β, α)| > |S≺M(β, α)|+ |S./M(β, α)|.
For a voting scheme s, s optimal and s optimum outcomes in mCP-nets are defined in the natural way.
An mCP-net is acyclic, binary, and singly connected, if all its CP-nets are acyclic, binary, and singly connected,
respectively. A class F of mCP-nets is polynomially connected, if the set of CP-nets constituting the mCP-nets
in F is a polynomially connected class of CP-nets. The indegree of an mCP-net is the maximum indegree of its
constituent individual CP-nets. Unless stated otherwise, we consider only polynomially connected classes of
acyclic binary mCP-nets. When the mCP-netM is clear from the context, we often omit the subscript “M”
from the above notations.
2.4 Computational complexity
We now give some notions from computational complexity theory, which will be required for the complexity
analysis carried out in this paper. First, we briefly recall the complexity classes that we will encounter in this
paper (along with some closely related ones), and then we recall the notion of polynomial-time reductions among
decision problems, and some decision problems that are hard for some of these complexity classes. We assume
that the reader has some elementary background in computational complexity theory, including the notions
of Boolean formulas and quantified Boolean formulas, Turing machines, and hardness and completeness of a
problem for a complexity class, as can be found, e.g., in [40, 60].
Complexity classes The class P is the set of all decision problems that can be solved by a deterministic
Turing machine in polynomial time with respect to the input size, i.e., with respect to the length of the string
that encodes the input instance. For a given input string s, its size is usually denoted by ‖s‖. The class of
decision problems that can be solved by nondeterministic Turing machines in polynomial time is denoted by NP.
They enjoy a remarkable property: any “yes”-instance s has a certificate for being a “yes”-instance, which has
polynomial length and can be checked in deterministic polynomial time (in ‖s‖). For example, deciding whether
a Boolean formula φ(X) over the Boolean variables X = {x1, . . . , xn} is satisfiable, i.e., whether there exists
some truth assignment to these variables making φ true, is a well-known problem in NP; in fact, any satisfying
truth assignment for φ is clearly a certificate that φ is a “yes”-instance, i.e., that φ is satisfiable.
For a complexity class C, we denote by co-C the complementary class to C, i.e., the class containing the
complementary languages of those in C. For example, the problem of deciding whether a Boolean formula φ is
not satisfiable is in co-NP. The class P is contained in both NP and co-NP, i.e., P ⊆ NP ∩ co-NP.
By LOGSPACE, we denote the set of decision problems that can be solved by deterministic Turing machines
in logarithmic space. For such machines, it is assumed that the input tape is read-only, and that these machine
have a read/write tape, called work tape, for intermediate computations. The logarithmic space bound is given
on the space available on the work tape. The class LOGSPACE is contained in P.
The class DP, defined originally in [61], is the class of problems that are a “conjunction” of two problems,
one from NP and one from co-NP, i.e., DP = {L | L = L′ ∩ L′′, L′ ∈ NP, L′′ ∈ co-NP}. The class co-DP is the
class of problems whose complements are in DP, equivalently, it can be defined as the class of problems that
are a “disjunction” of two problems, one from NP and one from co-NP, i.e., co-DP = {L | L = L′ ∪ L′′, L′ ∈
NP, L′′ ∈ co-NP}.
The classes ΣPk , ΠPk , and ∆Pk , forming the polynomial hierarchy (PH) [71], are defined as follows: ΣP0 = ΠP0 =
∆P0 = P, and, for all k ≥ 1, ΣPk = NPΣ
P
k−1 , ∆Pk = P
ΣPk−1 , and ΠPk = co-ΣPk . Here, ΣPk (resp., ∆Pk ) is the set of
decision problems solvable by nondeterministic (resp., deterministic) polynomial-time Turing machines with an
oracle to recognize, at unit cost, a language in ΣPk−1. Note that ΣP1 = NP
ΣP0 = NPP = NP, ΠP1 = co-ΣP0 = co-NP,
and ∆P1 = PΣ
P
0 = PP = P. Sometimes a bound is imposed on the number of calls that are allowed to be issued
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Figure 5: Inclusion relationships among complexity classes: an arrow from class C′ to class C′′ means that
C ′ ⊆ C ′′.
to the oracle. For example, ΘPk = P
ΣPk−1[O(logn)] denotes the set of decision problems solvable by a deterministic
polynomial-time Turing machine that is allowed to query a ΣPk−1 oracle at most logarithmically many times (in
the size of the input). By definition, ΘPk ⊆ ∆Pk .1
The classes DP and co-DP can be generalized to the classes DPk = {L | L = L′ ∩ L′′, L′ ∈ ΣPk , L′′ ∈ ΠPk }
and co-DPk = {L | L = L′ ∪ L′′, L′ ∈ ΣPk , L′′ ∈ ΠPk }, respectively, for k ≥ 1, that are the conjunction and the
disjunction, respectively, of ΣPk and ΠPk ; in particular, DP1 = DP. Note also that DPk ⊆ ΘPk+1.
Given their definitions, for all k ≥ 1, the relationships among the mentioned classes are as follows (see
Figure 5 for an illustration): (ΣPk ∪ΠPk ) ⊆ DPk , co-DPk ⊆ ΘPk+1 ⊆ ∆Pk+1 ⊆ (ΣPk+1 ∩ΠPk+1) (see, e.g., [72, 73]).
Reductions and hard problems A decision problem L1 is (Karp) reducible to a decision problem L2,
denoted L1 ≤ L2, if there is a computable function h, called (Karp) reduction, such that, for every string s, h(s)
is defined, and s is a “yes”-instance of L1 if and only if h(s) is a “yes”-instance of L2. A decision problem L1 is
polynomially (Karp) reducible to a decision problem L2, denoted L1 ≤p L2, if there is a polynomial-time (Karp)
reduction from L1 to L2. In this paper, we consider only Karp reductions.
To prove hardness for a complexity class, we show reductions from various problems known to be complete
for the complexity classes that they belong to. We next define such problems, so that we can later refer to them
by name.
Deciding the satisfiability of Boolean formulas, denoted Sat, is the prototypical NP-complete problem, which
remains NP-hard even if only 3CNF formulas are considered [26, 41], i.e., Boolean formulas in conjunctive
normal form with three literals per clause. The complementary problem Unsat of deciding whether a given
Boolean formula is not satisfiable is co-NP-complete. It remains co-NP-hard even if only 3CNF formulas are
considered, and it is the equivalent to the problem Taut of deciding whether a 3DNF formula is a tautology. A
3DNF formula is a Boolean formula in disjunctive normal form with three literals per term. CNFs and DNFs are
actually linked (see [28, 29]).
The prototypical ΣPk - and ΠPk -complete QBFQ1,k problems are defined as follows: given a quantified
Boolean formula (QBF) Φ = (Q1X1)(Q2X2) . . . (QkXk)φ(X1, X2, . . . , Xk), where
• Q1, Q2, . . . , Qk is a sequence of k alternating quantifiers Qi ∈ {∃,∀}, and
• φ(X1, X2, . . . , Xk) is a (non-quantified) Boolean formula over k disjoint sets X1, X2, . . . , Xk of Boolean
variables,
decide whether Φ is valid. The problem QBF∃,k is ΣPk -complete [71, 74], while QBF∀,k is ΠPk -complete [71, 74].
These problems remain hard for their respective classes even if φ(X1, X2, . . . , Xk) is in 3CNF, when Qk = ∃,
and if φ(X1, X2, . . . , Xk) is in 3DNF, when Qk = ∀ [71, 74]. We denote by QBFCNFk,∃ (resp., QBFDNFk,∀ )2 the
problem of deciding the validity of formulas Φ = (Q1X1) . . . (QkXk)φ(X1, . . . , Xk), where Qk is ∃ (resp., ∀),
and φ(X1, . . . , Xk) is in 3CNF (resp., 3DNF). For odd k, QBFCNFk,∃ (resp., QBFDNFk,∀ ) is complete for ΣPk (resp.,
ΠPk ), while, for even k, QBFCNFk,∃ (resp., QBFDNFk,∀ ) is complete for ΠPk (resp., ΣPk ). Observe that QBF
CNF
1,∃ (resp.,
QBFDNF1,∀ ) is equivalent to Sat (resp., Taut).
Sometimes, it is preferable that in QBF formulas the non-quantified formula is CNF rather than DNF, or
vice-versa. For example, to show ΣP2 -hardness it might be the case that we would prefer to start our reduction
from formulas Φ = (∃X)(∀Y )φ(X,Y ) with φ(X,Y ) being in CNF, rather than in DNF, as required by QBFDNF2,∀ .
To achieve this, we can exploit De Morgan’s laws. Indeed, we have that Φ = (Q1X1) . . . (QkXk)φ(X1, . . . , Xk) is
logically equivalent to Φ′ = (Q1X1) . . . (QkXk)¬φ′(X1, . . . , Xk), where φ′(X1, . . . , Xk) = ¬φ(X1, . . . , Xk). We
thus extend the notation above. We denote by QBFDNFk,∃,¬ (resp., QBFCNFk,∀,¬) the problem of deciding the validity
of formulas Φ = (Q1X1) . . . (QkXk)¬φ(X1, . . . , Xk), where Qk is ∃ (resp., ∀), and φ(X1, . . . , Xk) is in 3DNF
1For the complexity class ΘPk , an interesting characterization has recently been provided: Θ
P
k is the class of languages involving
the counting and comparison of the number of “yes”-instances in two sets containing instances of ΣPk−1 or Π
P
k−1 languages [55].
This is quite useful for reductions in voting settings where votes have to be counted and compared.
2Note the difference in the subscripts of the notations QBFQ1,k and QBF
CNF
k,Qk
(resp., QBFDNFk,Qk ). In the former notation, Q1 is
the first quantifier of the sequence, and, for notational convenience, we place “Q1” before “k” in the subscript. On the other hand,
in the latter notation, Qk is the last quantifier of the sequence, and, for notational convenience, we place “Qk” after “k” in the
subscript.
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(resp., 3CNF). For odd k, QBFDNFk,∃,¬ (resp., QBFCNFk,∀,¬) is complete for ΣPk (resp., ΠPk ), while, for even k, QBFDNFk,∃,¬
(resp., QBFCNFk,∀,¬) is complete for ΠPk (resp., ΣPk ).
2.5 A framework for preference representation schemes
In this paper, most of the membership results that we will show hold for generic preference representation
schemes. For this reason, we now introduce the general framework of representation schemes that we will refer to.
Inspired by the concept of compact representations in [18, 34, 36, 48], we define preference representation schemes
S as suitable encodings for a class of preference relations, denoted C(S ). Formally, a preference representation
scheme S defines a computable representation function ξS (·) and a computable Boolean function PrefS (·, ·, ·)
such that, for any relation R ∈ C(S ), ξS (R) is the encoding of R according to S , and PrefS (ξS (R), α, β)
evaluates to 1, if 〈α, β〉 ∈ R (i.e., if α R β), and to 0, otherwise. By ‖ξS (R)‖, we denote the size of the
representation of R via S .
Let S1 and S2 be two preference representation schemes. We say that S2 is at least as expressive (and
succinct) as S1, denoted S1 -e S2, if there exists a function f in FP (i.e., computable in deterministic
polynomial time) that translates a preference relation ξS1(R) represented in S1 into an equivalent preference
relation ξS2(R) represented in S2, i.e., into a preference relation over the same outcomes and with the
same preference relationships between them. More precisely, we require that ξS2(R) = f(ξS1(R)) and
PrefS1(ξS1(R), α, β) = PrefS2(ξS2(R), α, β), for each pair of outcomes α and β. Observe that f belonging to
FP entails that there exists a constant cf (depending on f) such that ‖ξS2(R)‖ ≤ ‖ξS1(R)‖cf , i.e., the size of
ξS2(R) is polynomially bounded in the size of ξS1(R).3
A P- and an NP-representation S is a preference representation scheme whose function PrefS is in P and NP,
respectively. For example, the polynomially connected classes of acyclic binary CP-nets are NP-representation
schemes.
When a compact representation S is clear from the context, we often simply write R instead of ξS (R), and
α R β and α 6R β instead of PrefS (ξS (R), α, β) = 1 and PrefS (ξS (R), α, β) = 0, respectively. While doing
so, we are identifying the preference relation with its actual representation.
3 Complexity of basic tasks on CP-nets
To precisely characterize the complexity of Pareto and majority voting tasks in Sections 4 and 5, we need to
understand how complex is deciding, given a CP-net N and two outcomes α and β, whether α dominates β or
whether α and β are incomparable. Here, we prove that the former problem is NP-complete, while the latter is
co-NP-complete. To achieve this, after giving some preliminary definitions on how to encode Boolean formulas
into CP-nets, we show that deciding the satisfiability of Boolean formula can be reduced to the problem of
deciding dominance between outcomes in CP-nets. This allows us to prove the NP-hardness of the dominance
test in CP-nets, and the co-NP-hardness of deciding incomparability is shown as a byproduct of this property.
3.1 Preliminaries
We first introduce a notation mapping Boolean assignments to outcomes of CP-nets; this notation will frequently
be used later in the paper. In particular, to prove the hardness of voting tasks on mCP-nets, we often provide
reductions from problems regarding the satisfiability (or validity) of (quantified) Boolean formulas. For this
reason, mCP-nets will often have sets of features associated with sets of Boolean variables. For example, for
a Boolean formula φ(X) over the set of Boolean variables X = {x1, . . . , xn}, we often define an mCP-net
M(φ) that has V = ⋃{{V Ti , V Fi } | xi ∈ X} as a subset of its set of features. Then, for a (partial or complete)
assignment σX over X, an outcome ασX of M(φ) encoding σX over the features set V is such that, for the
features in V, if σX [xi] = true, then ασX [V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi ; if σX [xi] = false, then ασX [V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi ; and if
σX [xi] is undefined, then ασX [V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi . The values of the features F /∈ V in ασX will be specified in each
particular case.
We next define formula nets, which will be used in hardness proofs, and which are intuitively CP-nets aiming
at having a particular preference relationship between two outcomes depending on the satisfiability of associated
Boolean formulas in CNF. This will allow us to show that deciding dominance in CP-nets is NP-hard.4
3Note that the above definitions are slightly different from the ones in [48]: the counterpart of this paper’s function Pref in [48]
is not required to be computable, and the transformation function f in [48] is only required to be polynomially bounded, but not
polynomially computable.
4The NP-hardness of dominance in CP-nets was proven already in [8]. Here, we show this result, because the construction
proposed here, which allows us to prove a stricter result, is different from the one available in the literature, and it is required in
multiple reductions in the rest of the paper.
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Figure 6: The CP-net F(φ), where φ(x1, x2, x3, x4) = (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3) ∧ (¬x2 ∨ x3 ∨ ¬x4). Not all the CP tables
are reported in the figure.
Formally, let φ(X) be a Boolean formula in 3CNF defined over the set of Boolean variables X = {x1, . . . , xn},
and whose set of clauses is C = {c1, . . . , cm}. We often omit the variable set from the notation of the Boolean
formula, i.e., we write φ instead of φ(X), if this does not cause ambiguity. We denote by `j,k the k-th literal of
the j-th clause. From φ(X), we build the CP-net F(φ) in the following way (see Figure 6 for an example).
The features of F(φ) are:
• for each variable xi ∈ X, there are features V Ti and V Fi (called variable features), and we denote by Vφ
the set of variable features;
• for each clause cj ∈ C, there is a feature Dj (called clause feature), and we denote by Dφ the set of clause
features; and
• for each literal `j,k, there is a feature Pj,k (called literal feature), and we denote by Pφ the set of literal
features.
All features are binary, with the usual notation for their values. When the formula φ is clear from the context,
we often omit the subscript “φ” from the notation of the sets of features illustrated above. The edges of F(φ)
are: for each literal `j,k = xi or `j,k = ¬xi, there are edges 〈V Ti , Pj,k〉, 〈V Fi , Pj,k〉, and 〈Pj,k, Dj〉. The CP tables
of F(φ) are:
• for each variable xi ∈ X, features V Ti and V Fi have the CP tables
vTi  vTi and vFi  vFi , respectively;
• for each literal `j,k, if `j,k = xi, then feature Pj,k has the CP table
vTi ∧ vFi pj,k  pj,k
else pj,k  pj,k ;
otherwise (i.e., `j,k = ¬xi) Pj,k has the CP table
vTi ∧ vFi pj,k  pj,k
else pj,k  pj,k ;
• for each clause cj ∈ C, feature Dj has the CP table
pj,1 ∨ pj,2 ∨ pj,3 dj  dj
else dj  dj .
Note that F(φ) is binary, acyclic, singly connected, its indegree is three, and the CP-net can be built in
polynomial time in the size of φ.
The following lemma and corollary show an important property of formula nets, which is that φ is satisfiable
if and only if a particular outcome dominates others in F(φ).
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Lemma 3.1. Let φ(X) be a Boolean formula in 3CNF defined over a set X of Boolean variables, and let σX
be an assignment on X. Let ασX be the outcome of F(φ) encoding σX on the feature set V, and assigning
non-overlined values to all other features, and let β be the outcome assigning overlined values to all and only
variable and clause features. Then:
(1) There is an extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β F(φ) ασX ;
(2) There is no extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β ./F(φ) ασX .
Proof (sketch). The idea at the base of this proof is that the CP tables in F(φ) are designed so that the features
enact the role of variables, literals, and clauses of a CNF Boolean formula. Details of the proof are at page 31.
Corollary 3.2. Let φ(X) be a Boolean formula in 3CNF defined over a set X of Boolean variables, and let α
and β be two outcomes of OF(φ) assigning non-overlined values to all features and overlined values to all and
only variable and clause features, respectively. Then:
• φ is satisfiable if and only if β F(φ) α;
• φ is unsatisfiable if and only if β ./F(φ) α.
Proof. Observe that, when the empty assignment σX is considered, outcomes ασX and βσX of the statement
of Lemma 3.1 coincide with outcomes α and β of the statement of this corollary, respectively. Moreover, any
assignment over X is an extension of the empty one, and hence Lemma 3.1 applies.
3.2 Complexity of dominance, incomparability, and optimality on CP-nets
As mentioned above, via formula nets, it is possible to show the NP-hardness and the co-NP-hardness of
dominance and incomparability on CP-nets, respectively. We start by showing the NP-hardness of dominance
on CP-nets. More formally, consider the following problem on CP-nets.
Problem: Dominance
Instance: A CP-net N , and two outcomes α, β ∈ ON .
Question: Is β N α?
Dominance is known to be feasible in NP for some classes of instances, and in particular it is in NP for
polynomially connected classes of acyclic binary CP-nets [8]. For these classes of CP-nets, it was shown that
Dominance is NP-hard, and hardness holds even if the considered CP-nets are singly connected and the indegree
of each feature in the net is at most six [8]. Moreover, Dominance is feasible in polynomial time on acyclic
binary CP-nets whose graph is a tree or a polytree [8]. However, the exact complexity of Dominance for general
(non polynomially connected classes of) acyclic binary CP-nets is still an open problem [8], and in particular it is
unknown whether it belongs to NP or not.
First, we give an improved result on the hardness of dominance testing in CP-nets. In particular, we show
that the NP-hardness holds even if the indegree of the CP-net is three, while the minimum indegree previously
required to show the hardness was six [8].
Theorem 3.3 (improved over [8]). Let N be a CP-net, and let α, β ∈ ON be two outcomes. Deciding whether
β N α is NP-hard. Hardness holds even if N is acyclic, binary, singly connected, and its indegree is three.
Proof. To show that Dominance is NP-hard, we prove that Sat ≤p Dominance. Let φ be a Boolean formula
in 3CNF. Consider the CP-net F(φ) (defined in Section 3.1) and outcomes α and β such that in α the values of
all features are non-overlined, and in β the values of all and only variable and clause features are overlined. By
Corollary 3.2, φ is satisfiable if and only if β F(φ) α.
We now focus on the problem of testing incomparability between outcomes in CP-nets and show its
co-NP-completeness. We show hardness via the properties of formula nets. More formally, consider the following
problem.
Problem: Incomparability
Instance: A CP-net N , and two outcomes α, β ∈ ON .
Question: Is α ./N β?
The following theorem shows that deciding whether two outcomes are incomparable in a preference relation
represented via an NP-representation scheme is in co-NP.
Theorem 3.4. Let R be a preference relation represented via an NP-representation scheme, and let α and β be
two outcomes. Deciding whether α ./R β is feasible in co-NP.
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Proof. We show that disproving α ./ β is feasible in NP. In fact, if α 6./ β, then either α  β or β  α. In these
cases, since R is represented via an NP-representation, there is a polynomial certificate either witnessing α  β
or witnessing β  α. To conclude, observe that such a certificate can be checked in polynomial time.
We now focus on CP-nets and show that deciding incomparability is co-NP-hard.
Theorem 3.5. Let N be a CP-net, and let α and β be two outcomes. Deciding whether α ./N β is co-NP-hard.
Hardness holds even if N is acyclic, binary, singly connected, and its indegree is three.
Proof. To show that Incomparability is co-NP-hard, we prove that Unsat ≤p Incomparability. Let φ be a
Boolean formula in 3CNF. Consider the CP-net F(φ) (defined in Section 3.1) and outcomes α and β such that
in α the values of all features are non-overlined, and in β the values of all and only variable and clause features
are overlined. By Corollary 3.2, φ is unsatisfiable if and only if α ./F(φ) β.
By combining the previous two results, we obtain that testing incomparability over polynomially connected
classes of acyclic CP-nets is co-NP-complete.
Corollary 3.6. Let C be a polynomially connected class of acyclic CP-nets. Let N ∈ C be a CP-net, and let α
and β be two outcomes. Deciding whether α ./N β is co-NP-complete.
We emphasize here that checking the incomparability between two outcomes is different from deciding the
“ordering query” defined in [8]. For a CP-net N and two outcomes α and β, an ordering query is deciding whether
there is at least a preference raking R satisfying N such that α R β. As noticed in [8], this is tantamount to
decide whether N 6|= β  α. Since N 6|= β  α if and only if β 6N α, deciding an ordering query is actually
co-NP-hard, because dominance testing is NP-hard. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the polynomial
algorithm proposed in [8] to decide ordering queries is actually “partially complete” (as said in [8]). In fact, given
the co-NP-hardness of the ordering query problem, there is no sound and complete deterministic polynomial-time
algorithm for this problem (unless a major breakthrough in complexity theory occurs, showing that P = NP).
We conclude this section by looking at the complexity of deciding whether an outcome is optimal in a CP-net.
This result is needed in Section 4 to characterize the complexity of one of the voting tasks of Pareto voting.
Here, we show that this problem can be decided in LOGSPACE. More formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Optimality-Testing
Instance: A CP-net N , and an outcome α ∈ ON .
Question: Is α optimal in N?
Recall that for acyclic CP-nets, there is an outcome that is optimum [8]. Clearly, this outcome is also the
only optimal one in a CP-net. Therefore, checking whether an outcome is optimal is tantamount to checking
whether the outcome is optimum. It was shown that, given an acyclic CP-net N , computing the unique optimal
outcome oN of N is feasible in deterministic polynomial time, more precisely in linear time, through the “forward
sweep” procedure [8]. Hence, as pointed out in [64], a simple procedure to decide whether a given outcome α is
optimal in an acyclic CP-net N is to compute oN (in polynomial time) and then to compare α to oN . However,
this problem actually belongs to a complexity class that is a below P when acyclic CP-nets are considered.
Theorem 3.7. Let N be an acyclic CP-net, and let α ∈ ON be an outcome. Deciding whether α is optimal in
N is feasible in LOGSPACE.
Proof. Being N acyclic, if an outcome α is not optimal in N , then there is an improving flipping sequence from
α to the optimum outcome, and hence there is at least a feature whose value can be flipped in α to obtain a
better outcome. Therefore, to decide whether α is optimal, it suffices to consider in turn all features F and
check whether it is possible to perform an improving flip according to the CP table of F . If no feature can be
flipped to improve the outcome, then α is optimal. Clearly, this procedure requires only logarithmic space to be
carried out.
Now that we have analyzed the complexity of dominance, incomparability, and optimality in CP-nets, we can
devote our focus to the complexity of Pareto and majority voting on CP-nets in the next two sections.
4 Complexity of Pareto voting on mCP-nets
In this section, we characterize the complexity of Pareto voting tasks on mCP-nets. In particular, after giving
some preliminaries on specific structures of CP-nets that we will use in our reductions, we analyze the complexity
of Pareto dominance, which is proven NP-complete. Then, we devote our analysis to the problems related to
Pareto optimal outcomes, namely, deciding whether an outcome is Pareto optimal, and deciding whether an
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Figure 7: An interconnecting net HC(9). Not all the CP tables are reported in the figure.
mCP-net has a Pareto optimal outcome. We prove the former co-NP-complete, while for the latter, we are
able to show that every mCP-net has a Pareto optimal outcome, which implies that the problem is trivial (i.e.,
feasible in constant time). To conclude, we study the complexity of problems on Pareto optimum outcomes,
namely, deciding whether an outcome is Pareto optimum, and deciding whether an mCP-net has a Pareto
optimum outcome. Both problems are proven to be tractable, and in particular we show the former to be in
feasible in LOGSPACE and the latter to be feasible in P. We recall that the Pareto voting semantics is based on
the concept of unanimity, i.e., given an mCP-netM and two outcomes α, β ∈ OM, it holds that β pM α, if all
agents prefer β to α, i.e., |SM(β, α)| = m.
4.1 Preliminaries
We now introduce a specific structure of CP-nets that will be used in the forthcoming reductions. In particular,
the conjunctive HC(·) and disjunctive HD(·) interconnecting nets are CP-nets whose role is intuitively to link
different parts of bigger CP-nets: given a set S of m features, the aim of the CP-nets HC(m) and HD(m) is to
propagate the information that all features of S and at least one of the features of S, respectively, have been
flipped to their overlined value.
We first introduce the conjunctive interconnecting CP-net HC(m). See Figure 7 for an example of a HC(9)
interconnecting net. Such a CP-net is partitioned into layers, and it is a kind of “inverted pyramid”. In particular,
HC(m) is an acyclic DAG in which each feature of a layer has two or three distinct parents in the previous layer,
and at most one child in the next layer. Features belonging to the same layer have no parents in common, and in
every layer at most one feature has three parents. The first layer of HC(m) is attached to a set S of m different
features of the CP-net that we want to interconnect. In the first layer, the above described connection properties
hold relative to the features of S. The layer with a unique feature, which we call apex, is the last layer of the
CP-net. All the features of HC(m) are named Ai with a proper increasing index i, and their values are, as usual,
{ai, ai}. The CP table for a feature Ai states that value ai is preferred to ai whenever the value of every parent
of Ai is overlined. Otherwise, the value ai is preferred to ai. Let α be the outcome in which the values of all the
features Ai are non-overlined. It is not difficult to see that, whenever all the features in S have overlined values
in α, there is an improving flipping sequence starting from α changing the values of all Ai (and hence also the
value of the apex) to their overlined values.
The disjunctive interconnecting net HD(m) is similar to HC(m). The features and the structure of HD(m)
are the same as those in HC(m). The only variations are on the CP tables. Being HD(m) a disjunctive net, given
a feature Ai of HD(m), value ai is preferred to value ai, whenever at least one of the parents of Ai has been
flipped to its overlined value. Let α be the outcome in which the values of all the features Ai are non-overlined.
It is easy to see that, whenever at least a feature in S has an overlined value in α, there is an improving flipping
sequence starting from α and reaching an outcome in which the apex has an overlined value.
Note that HC(m) and HD(m) are binary, acyclic, singly connected, their indegree is at most three, and the
CP-nets can be built in polynomial time in |S| = m, as the number of their features is polynomial in m (in
particular, strictly less than m), and each feature has a bounded number of parents which translates into CP
tables of bounded sizes.
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4.2 Complexity of Pareto dominance on mCP-nets
First, we analyze the problem of deciding Pareto dominance on CP-nets, which is shown NP-complete. More
formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Pareto-Dominance
Instance: An mCP-netM, and two outcomes α, β ∈ OM.
Question: Is β pM α?
The following theorem shows that deciding Pareto dominance over preference profiles represented via an
NP-representation scheme is in NP.
Theorem 4.1. Let P be a preference profile defined over the same combinatorial domain and represented via an
NP-representation scheme, and let α and β be two outcomes. Then, deciding whether β pP α is feasible in NP.
Proof. To show that this problem resides in NP, we exhibit a concise certificate for it. Let P = 〈R1, . . . ,Rm〉.
If β pP α, then, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, it holds that β Ri α. Since, for every agent i, Ri is represented via an
NP-representation scheme, there is a concise certificate witnessing that β Ri α. Therefore, in order to decide
whether β pP α, it suffices to guess and subsequently check the polynomial witnesses that, for each agent i,
it holds that β Ri α. The overall guess requires only polynomial space, and it can be checked in polynomial
time.
Observe that on 1CP-nets, Pareto dominance is equivalent to dominance (on simple CP-nets). Therefore, the
following result, which follows directly from Theorem 3.3, shows that deciding Pareto dominance in mCP-nets is
NP-hard.
Theorem 4.2. LetM be an mCP-net, and let α and β be two outcomes. Then, deciding whether β pM α is
NP-hard. Hardness holds even on classes of singly connected acyclic binary mCP-nets with indegree at most
three and at most one agent.
By combining the two previous results, we immediately obtain that Pareto dominance over polynomially
connected classes of acyclic mCP-nets is NP-complete.
Corollary 4.3. Let C be a polynomially connected class of acyclic mCP-nets. LetM∈ C be an mCP-net, and
let α and β be two outcomes. Then, deciding whether β pM α is NP-complete.
4.3 Complexity of Pareto optimality on mCP-nets
Here, we devote our analysis to problems on Pareto optimal outcomes. In particular, the problems analyzed
are deciding whether an outcome is Pareto optimal, and deciding whether an mCP-net has a Pareto optimal
outcome. We first focus on deciding Pareto optimality of outcomes in mCP-nets. We show that this problem is
co-NP-complete. More formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Is-Pareto-Optimal
Instance: An mCP-netM, and an outcome α ∈ OM.
Question: Is α Pareto optimal inM?
The following result shows that, for a preference profile represented via an NP-representation scheme, deciding
the Pareto optimality of an outcome is feasible in co-NP.
Theorem 4.4. Let P be a preference profile defined over the same combinatorial domain and represented via
an NP-representation scheme, and let α be an outcome. Then, deciding whether α is Pareto optimal in P is
feasible in co-NP.
Proof. We show that disproving α being Pareto optimal is feasible in NP. If α is not Pareto optimal in P, then
there is an outcome β such that β pP α. Therefore, we can guess such an outcome β along with the witness
that β pP α. This guess requires only polynomial space and can be checked in polynomial time (see the proof
of Theorem 4.1).
To prove the co-NP-hardness of Is-Pareto-Optimal, we use a reduction from Unsat. Consider the following
construction. Let φ(X) be a Boolean formula in 3CNF defined over the set of Boolean variables X = {x1, . . . , xn},
and whose set of clauses is C = {c1, . . . , cm}. From φ, we build the 2CP-net Mipo(φ) = 〈N ipo1 ,N ipo2 〉 in the
following way. The CP-nets N ipo1 and N
ipo
2 are built similarly, and we discuss first N
ipo
1 . See Figure 8 for a
schematic representation of the interconnections between the building blocks of N ipo1 and N
ipo
2 .
In N ipo1 , there are two complete copies of the net F(φ) (defined in Section 3.1), with its features, edges, and
CP tables. To distinguish these two copies, we append two different superscript to them and obtain F(φ)a and
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Figure 8: A schematic representation of the building blocks of the 2CP-netMipo(φ) = 〈N ipo1 ,N ipo2 〉.
F(φ)b. All features of these two nets have the corresponding superscript a or b to make them different and
distinguish them from the others. The clause features of F(φ)a, i.e., D1a, . . . , Dma, are attached to a conjunctive
interconnecting net HC(m) (defined in Section 4.1). The apex A of HC(m) is attached to all the variable features
of F(φ)b. Since the variable features of F(φ)b now have one parent (more precisely the same parent, i.e., the
apex of HC(m)), the CP tables of these features are a bit different from those in F(φ). Variable features F of
F(φ)b have the CP tables
a f  f
a f  f .
The CP-net N ipo2 is similar to N
ipo
1 , with the only difference that the conjunctive interconnecting CP-net
HC(m) attaches the clause features of F(φ)b to the variable features of F(φ)a. The CP tables in N ipo2 of the
variable features of F(φ)a are therefore modified accordingly.
Observe thatMipo(φ) is acyclic, binary, its indegree is three, and can be computed in polynomial time from
φ. Moreover, the class of mCP-nets {Mipo(φ)}φ derived from formulas φ of the specified kind and according to
the reduction shown above is polynomially connected. The following result shows that φ(X) is satisfiable if and
only if a particular outcome ofMipo(φ) is not Pareto optimal.
Lemma 4.5. Let φ(X) be a 3CNF Boolean formula, and let α be the outcome ofMipo(φ) assigning non-overlined
values to all features. Then, φ(X) is satisfiable if and only if α is not Pareto optimal inMipo(φ).
Proof (sketch). The key point of the proof is that the features of the formula net downline of the interconnecting
net can be flipped to their overlined values if and only if the formula φ is satisfiable. Details of the proof are at
page 32.
The above property implies that, in mCP-nets, deciding the Pareto optimality of an outcome is co-NP-hard.
Theorem 4.6. LetM be an mCP-net, and let α ∈ OM be an outcome. Deciding whether α is Pareto optimal
is co-NP-hard. Hardness holds even on polynomially connected classes of acyclic binary mCP-nets with indegree
at most three and at most two agents.
Proof. We prove that Is-Pareto-Optimal is co-NP-hard by showing a reduction from Unsat. Let φ(X) be a
3CNF formula, and consider the 2CP-netMipo(φ) = 〈N ipo1 ,N ipo2 〉. Consider the outcome α ∈ OMipo(φ) in which
the values of all features are non-overlined. By Lemma 4.5, φ(X) is unsatisfiable (and hence a “yes”-instance of
Unsat) if and only if α is Pareto optimal inMipo(φ).
Notice here that the presence of at least two agents in an mCP-net is an essential source of complexity for
the problem Is-Pareto-Optimal. In fact, if there were only one agent, then deciding whether an outcome α is
Pareto optimal would be tantamount to checking whether α is optimal for that only agent, and we have seen
already that this task can be carried out in LOGSPACE (see Theorem 3.7).
By combining the two above results, we immediately conclude that deciding the Pareto optimality of an
outcome over polynomially connected classes of acyclic mCP-nets is co-NP-complete.
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Corollary 4.7. Let C be a polynomially connected class of acyclic mCP-nets. LetM∈ C be an mCP-net, and
let α ∈ OM be an outcome. Deciding whether α is Pareto optimal is co-NP-complete.
We now focus on the problem of deciding the existence of Pareto optimal outcomes in mCP-nets. We show
that every mCP-nets has a Pareto optimal outcome, which implies that the problem is trivial (i.e., feasible in
constant time). More formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Exists-Pareto-Optimal
Instance: An mCP-netM.
Question: DoesM have a Pareto optimal outcome?
The following lemma shows that an acyclic CP-net has always a Pareto optimal outcome. Its proof is different
from the proof of a similar result that appeared in [64].
Lemma 4.8 (different proof from [64]). LetM be an acyclic mCP-net. Then,M has (always) a Pareto optimal
outcome.
Proof. Let M = 〈N1, . . . ,Nm〉 be an mCP-net, and assume by contradiction that M has no Pareto optimal
outcome. Consider any net Ni ofM. By the fact that Ni is acyclic, it follows that there is a unique optimum
outcome oNi in Ni. Since we assume that inM there are no Pareto optimal outcomes, there must be an outcome
β 6= oNi such that β pM oNi , i.e., β is preferred to oNi by all agents ofM. However, there is no outcome β
such that β Ni oNi , because oNi is the optimum outcome in Ni: a contradiction. Therefore, there must be a
Pareto optimal outcome inM.
4.4 Complexity of Pareto optimums on mCP-nets
We now focus on Pareto optimum outcomes. In particular, the problems analyzed are deciding whether an
outcome is Pareto optimum, and deciding whether an mCP-net has a Pareto optimum outcome. To study the
complexity of these problems, we first prove an intermediate property stating that an mCP-net has a Pareto
optimum outcome if and only if all its individual CP-nets have the very same optimum outcome.
Lemma 4.9. Let M be an acyclic mCP-net. Then, M has a Pareto optimum outcome if and only if all the
individual CP-nets ofM have the very same optimum outcome (that, in which case, is also the Pareto optimum
outcome ofM).
Proof. We show first that if M = 〈N1, . . . ,Nm〉 has a Pareto optimum outcome α, then all the individual
CP-nets have the very same optimum outcome, which is α. By definition, a Pareto optimum outcome is unique
and Pareto dominates all other outcomes. This means that, for any outcome β 6= α, and for all i, α Ni β. We
know that in each individual CP-net the only outcome dominating all the others is the individual optimum.
Therefore, α equals all the individual optimum outcomes. The other direction of the proof is easy.
Based on the property above, we characterize the complexity of problems on Pareto optimum outcomes.
We first focus on deciding whether outcomes are Pareto optimum in mCP-nets. We show that this problem is
solvable in LOGSPACE. More formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Is-Pareto-Optimum
Instance: An mCP-netM and an outcome α.
Question: Is α Pareto optimum inM?
The following theorem shows that, in acyclic mCP-nets, deciding that an outcome is Pareto optimum is
feasible in LOGSPACE.
Theorem 4.10. LetM be an acyclic mCP-net, and let α ∈ OM be an outcome. Deciding whether α is Pareto
optimum inM is feasible in LOGSPACE.
Proof. From Lemma 4.9, we know that α is Pareto optimum in M if and only if α equals all the individual
optimum outcomes of the individual CP-nets ofM. Therefore, in order to check whether α is actually Pareto
optimum it suffices to check, for each individual CP-net in turn, whether α is the individual optimal outcome
for that agent. If α is different from even just one of the individual optimum outcomes, then α is not Pareto
optimum. Remember that checking the individual optimality of α is feasible in LOGSPACE (see Theorem 3.7),
and hence, by reusing of work space, we can check in LOGSPACE whether α equals all the individual optimum
outcomes.
To conclude, we study the complexity of deciding whether an mCP-net has a Pareto optimum outcome. We
show that this problem is feasible in P. More formally, consider the following problem.
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Figure 9: The 4CP-netMNoWin of Theorem 5.1.
Problem: Exists-Pareto-Optimum
Instance: An mCP-netM.
Question: DoesM have a Pareto optimum outcome?
The following theorem states that deciding whether an acyclic mCP-net has a Pareto optimum outcome is
in P.
Theorem 4.11. LetM be an acyclic mCP-net. Deciding whetherM has a Pareto optimum outcome is feasible
in P.
Proof. From Lemma 4.9, we know that M has a Pareto optimum outcome if and only if all the individual
CP-nets have the very same individual optimum outcome. Hence, in order to decide whetherM has a Pareto
optimum outcome, it suffices to compute the individual optimum outcome of the first agent. We can do this in
polynomial time [8]. After this, we compare the just computed individual optimum outcome with all the other
individual optimum outcomes. This can be carried out, by reusing of working space, in logarithmic space (see
Theorem 4.10), and hence in polynomial time (by the inclusion LOGSPACE ⊆ P). If all the individual optimum
outcomes are equal, then we answer yes, otherwise no. Observe that the overall procedure is feasible in P.
5 Complexity of majority voting on mCP-nets
In this section, we characterize the complexity of majority voting tasks on mCP-nets. We start with a preliminary
section by showing that there are mCP-nets without majority optimal and optimum outcomes, which implies that
deciding the existence of majority optimal and optimum outcomes is not a trivial problem. In the preliminary
section, we also define some CP-nets that will be used in the reductions exhibited in this section. More specifically,
we will introduce directs nets, which are CP-nets having a designated outcome as optimal. Moreover, we introduce
summarized formula nets, which, similarly to formula nets, are CP-nets encoding Boolean formulas, but they
associate the satisfiability of formulas with outcomes having specific values on just two features. Then, we
analyze the complexity of deciding majority dominance in mCP-nets, which is shown NP-complete. Subsequently,
we devote our analysis to the problems related to majority optimal outcomes, namely, deciding whether an
outcome is majority optimal, and deciding whether an mCP-net has a majority optimal outcome. We prove
the former co-NP-complete and the latter ΣP2 -complete. To conclude, we study the complexity of problems on
majority optimum outcomes, namely, deciding whether an outcome is majority optimum, and deciding whether
an mCP-net has a majority optimum outcome. We prove the former ΠP2 -complete and the latter is shown
ΠP2 -hard and belonging to DP2 .
Recall that, given an mCP-net M and two different outcomes α, β ∈ OM, it holds that β majM α, if the
majority of agents prefer β to α, i.e., |SM(β, α)| > |S≺M(β, α)|+ |S./M(β, α)|. What we call majority optimal and
majority optimum outcomes, in some works (see, e.g., [25, 51]) are named weak and (strong) Condorcet winners,
respectively. However, in the literature (see, e.g., [4, 16, 17]), the nomenclature of weak/strong Condorcet winner
has also been used with a slightly different meaning. To avoid any confusion, in this paper, we prefer to stick to
the concepts of majority optimal and majority optimum outcomes, which we introduced in Section 2.
5.1 Preliminaries
We first show that there are mCP-nets that do not have any majority optimal outcome, and hence neither a
majority optimum outcome. Thus, deciding whether an mCP-net has majority optimal or optimum outcomes is
a non-trivial problem.
Theorem 5.1. There are acyclic binary singly-connected mCP-nets not having majority optimal and majority
optimum outcomes.
Proof. Consider the acyclic binary singly connected 4CP-netMNoWin = 〈N1,N2,N3,N4〉 defined in Figure 9.
The preferences encoded in the four nets are: ab N1 ab N1 ab N1 ab; ab N2 ab N2 ab N2 ab;
ab N3 ab N3 ab N3 ab; and ab N4 ab N4 ab N4 ab. Observe that: ab is not majority optimal,
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Figure 10: The direct net D(α), with α = abc.
Figure 11: A schematic representation of CP-net Fs(φ).
because ab majMNoWin ab; ab is not majority optimal, because ab 
maj
MNoWin ab; ab is not majority optimal, because
ab majMNoWin ab; and ab is not majority optimal, because ab 
maj
MNoWin ab. This implies that MNoWin does not
have any majority optimal outcome, and hence also either a majority optimum outcome.
We now define two CP-nets that will be used in the reductions of this section on majority voting. First, we
define direct nets, which intuitively are CP-nets that have a specific desired optimum outcome (recall that an
acyclic CP-net has a unique optimal outcome, which is also optimum). Let S be a set of binary features defined over
the usual values, and let α ∈ Dom(S) be an outcome over S. The direct net D(α) = 〈GD(α),DomD(α),CPTD(α)〉
is the CP-net such that FD(α) = S, ED(α) = ∅, the domain of each feature F of D(α) is the same as the domain
of F in S, and the CP tables of D(α) are such that, given a feature F , if α[F ] = f , then the CP table for F
is f  f , otherwise (i.e., α[F ] = f) the CP table for F is f  f . See Figure 10 for an example. Clearly,
given any outcome β ∈ OD(α) such that β 6= α, it holds that α D(α) β. Moreover, let β and γ be two different
outcomes of D(α) such that, for all features F for which γ[F ] 6= β[F ], it holds that γ[F ] = α[F ] (and hence
β[F ] 6= α[F ]). Then, γ D(α) β. Note that D(α) is binary, acyclic, singly connected, its indegree is zero, and the
net can be built in polynomial time from α.
We finally introduce summarized formula nets, which are similar to formula nets (of Section 3.1), with the
advantage that these new nets put in relationship the satisfiability of Boolean formulas with the flip of only two
features, instead of with the flip of all variable and clause features. This advantage comes at cost of loosing the
single connectedness property of the nets, which, instead, is satisfied in non-summarized formula nets. Formally,
let φ(X) be a Boolean formula in 3CNF defined over the set of Boolean variables X = {x1, . . . , xn}, and whose
set of clauses is C = {c1, . . . , cm}. From φ(X), we build the CP-net Fs(φ) in the following way (see Figure 11).
The CP-net Fs(φ) embeds a formula net F(φ) (defined in Section 3.1) with its features and links. Moreover,
in Fs(φ), there is an interconnecting net HC(m) (defined in Section 4.1), which is attached to all clause features
of F(φ). We denote by A the set of features belonging to the net HC(m) embedded in Fs(φ). To conclude with
the features of Fs(φ), there are two more features: U1 and U2, where U1 has no parents and is linked to all
variable and literal features of F(φ), while U2 is not the parent of any feature and its unique parent is the apex
of the interconnecting net.
The CP tables of Fs(φ) are as follows:
• feature U1 has the CP table u1  u1 ;
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• for each variable xi ∈ X, features V Ti and V Fi have the CP tables
u1 vTi  vTi
u1 v
T
i  vTi
and u1 v
F
i  vFi
u1 v
F
i  vFi
, respectively;
• for each literal `j,k, if `j,k = xi, then feature Pj,k has the CP table
u1 ∧ vTi ∧ vFi pj,k  pj,k
else pj,k  pj,k ;
otherwise, if `j,k = ¬xi, then Pj,k has the CP table
u1 ∧ vTi ∧ vFi pj,k  pj,k
else pj,k  pj,k ;
• clause features have the same CP table as in F(φ);
• features of the conjunctive interconnecting net HC(m) have the usual CP tables;
• feature U2, if feature A is the apex of the interconnecting net, has the CP table
a u2  u2
a u2  u2 .
Note that Fs(φ) is binary, acyclic, its indegree is three, and the net can be built in polynomial time in the size
of φ. Moreover, the class of mCP-nets {Mipo(φ)}φ derived from formulas φ of the specified kind and according
to the reduction shown above is polynomially connected.
Now we give an equivalent of Lemma 3.1 for Fs(φ). In particular, the following lemma and corollary show
that φ is satisfiable if and only if a particular outcome dominates others in Fs(φ).
Lemma 5.2. Let φ(X) be a Boolean formula in 3CNF defined over a set X of Boolean variables, and let σX
be an assignment on X. Let ασX be the outcome of Fs(φ) encoding σX on the feature set V, and assigning
non-overlined values to all other features. Let β be an outcome of Fs(φ) such that β[U1U2] = u1u2, assigning
any value to the features of V, and assigning non-overlined values to all other features. Then:
(1) There is an extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β Fs(φ) ασX ;
(2) There is no extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β ./Fs(φ) ασX .
Proof (sketch). The intuition at the base of the proof of this property is that, by linking U1 to variable and
literal features, these cannot be flipped to their overlined values once U1 is u1. Therefore, distinct literal features,
attached to the same features V Ti and V Fi , cannot be flipped to their overlined values according to contrasting
values of V Ti and V Fi . Details of the proof are at page 32.
Corollary 5.3. Let φ(X) be a Boolean formula in 3CNF, and let α and β be two outcomes of OFs(φ) such that
in α the values of all features are non-overlined, and in β the values of only U1 and of U2 are overlined. Then:
• φ(X) is satisfiable if and only if β Fs(φ) α, and
• φ(X) is unsatisfiable if and only if β ./Fs(φ) α.
Proof. Observe that, when the empty assignment σX is considered, outcome ασX of the statement of Lemma 5.2
coincides with outcome α of the statement of this corollary. Moreover, any assignment over X is an extension of
the empty one, and hence Lemma 5.2 applies.
5.2 Complexity of majority dominance on mCP-nets
First, we analyze the problem of deciding majority dominance on CP-nets, which is shown NP-complete. More
formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Majority-Dominance
Instance: An mCP-netM, and two outcomes α, β ∈ OM.
Question: Is β majM α?
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The following result shows that, for preference profiles represented via an NP-representation scheme, deciding
majority dominance is feasible in NP.
Theorem 5.4. Let P be a preference profile defined over the same combinatorial domain and represented via
an NP-representation scheme, and let α and β be two outcomes. Then, deciding whether β majP α is feasible in
NP.
Proof. Let P = 〈R1, . . . ,Rm〉. Observe first that, since |SP(β, α)|+ |S≺P(β, α)|+ |S./P(β, α)| = m, it holds that
|SP(β, α)| > |S≺P(β, α)|+ |S./P(β, α)| if and only if |SP(β, α)| >
⌊
m
2
⌋
. If β majP α, then, for more than half of
the agents i, β Ri α. For such agents, since the preferences are represented via an NP-representation scheme,
there is a polynomial witness that they prefer β to α. Therefore, to show that β majP α, it suffices to guess a
set S of players preferring β to α, along with the polynomial witness of their preference, and then check that
|S| > ⌊m2 ⌋ and that the witnesses are valid. The overall guess requires only polynomial space, and it can be
checked in polynomial time.
Observe that, on 1CP-nets, majority dominance is equivalent to dominance on (simple) CP-nets. Therefore,
the following result, which follows directly from Theorem 3.3, states that on mCP-nets deciding majority
dominance is NP-hard.
Theorem 5.5. LetM be an mCP-net, and let α, β ∈ OM be two outcomes. Then, deciding whether β majM α
is NP-hard. Hardness holds even on classes of singly connected acyclic binary mCP-nets with indegree at most
three and at most one agent.
By combining the two above results, we immediately obtain that deciding majority dominance over polyno-
mially connected classes of acyclic mCP-nets is NP-complete.
Corollary 5.6. Let C be a polynomially connected class of acyclic mCP-nets. LetM∈ C be an mCP-net, and
let α, β ∈ OM be two outcomes. Then, deciding whether β majM α is NP-complete.
5.3 Complexity of majority optimality on mCP-nets
Here, we analyze the problems on majority optimal outcomes. In particular, the problems considered are
deciding whether an outcome is majority optimal, and deciding whether an mCP-net has a majority optimal
outcome. We first focus on deciding majority optimality of outcomes in mCP-nets. We show that this problem
is co-NP-complete. More formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Is-Majority-Optimal
Instance: An mCP-netM, and an outcome α ∈ OM.
Question: Is α majority optimal inM?
The following theorem shows that, on preference profiles represented via an NP-representation scheme,
deciding whether an outcome is majority optimal is feasible in co-NP.
Theorem 5.7. Let P be a preference profile defined over the same combinatorial domain and represented via
an NP-representation scheme, and let α be an outcome. Then, deciding whether α is majority optimal in P is
feasible in co-NP.
Proof. We show that disproving α being majority optimal is feasible in NP. If α is not majority optimal in P,
then there is an outcome β such that β majP α. Therefore, we can guess such an outcome β along with the
witness that β majP α (i.e., the set of agents preferring β to α). This guess requires only polynomial space, and
can be checked in polynomial time (see the proof of Theorem 5.4).
Observe that, on 2CP-nets, majority dominance and Pareto dominance are equivalent. Therefore, the
following result, which follows directly from Theorem 4.6, shows that on mCP-nets deciding majority optimality
is co-NP-hard.
Theorem 5.8. LetM be an mCP-net, and let α ∈ OM be an outcome. Then, deciding whether α is majority
optimal is co-NP-hard. Hardness holds even on polynomially connected classes of acyclic binary mCP-nets with
indegree at most three and at most two agents.
By combining the two previous results, it follows immediately that deciding the majority optimality of an
outcome over polynomially connected classes of acyclic mCP-nets is co-NP-complete.
Corollary 5.9. Let C be a polynomially connected class of acyclic mCP-nets. LetM∈ C be an mCP-net, and
let α ∈ OM be an outcome. Then, deciding whether α is majority optimal is co-NP-complete.
We now focus on the problem of deciding the existence of majority optimal outcomes in mCP-nets. We show
that this problem is ΣP2 -complete. More formally, consider the following problem.
21
Figure 12: A schematic illustration of net N eml3 ofMeml(Φ). The direct net embedded in N eml3 is not reported
in the figure.
Problem: Exists-Majority-Optimal
Instance: An mCP-netM.
Question: DoesM have a majority optimal outcome?
The following theorem shows that deciding whether a preference profile represented via an NP-representation
scheme has a majority optimal outcome is feasible in ΣP2 .
Theorem 5.10. Let P be a preference profile defined over the same combinatorial domain and represented via
an NP-representation scheme. Then, deciding whether P has a majority optimal outcome is feasible in ΣP2 .
Proof. To show that P has a majority optimal outcome, it suffices to guess an outcome α and then check that
α is actually majority optimal. Observe that guessing α requires an NP machine, and the final check is feasible
in co-NP (see Theorem 5.7), which can be carried out by an oracle. Therefore, the overall procedure is feasible
in ΣP2 .
To prove the ΣP2 -hardness of Exists-Majority-Optimal, we use a reduction from QBFCNF2,∀,¬. Consider the
following construction. Let Φ = (∃X)(∀Y )¬φ(X,Y ) be a quantified formula where φ(X,Y ) is a 3CNF Boolean
formula defined over two disjoint sets X = {x1, . . . , xnX} and Y = {y1, . . . , ynY } of Boolean variables, and whose
set of clauses is C = {c1, . . . , cm}. From Φ, we define the 6CP-netMeml(Φ) = 〈N eml1 , . . . ,N eml6 〉 as follows.
The features ofMeml(Φ) are:
• all the features of a net Fs(φ) (defined in Section 5.1) in which, in this case, we distinguish two variable
feature sets V = {V Ti , V Fi | xi ∈ X} and W = {WTi ,WFi | yi ∈ Y } (recall that P and D are the sets of
literal and clause features, respectively, and A is the set of features of the conjunctive interconnecting net
embedded in Fs(φ)); for further reference, we call A the apex of the interconnecting net;
• all the features of set V ′ = {V ′i | xi ∈ X};
• all the features of the set B which are the features Bi of a disjunctive interconnecting net HD(|V ′|+ |W|+
|P|+ |D|+ |A|) and its apex is feature B (observe that features Bi are distinct from features Ai of the
conjunctive interconnecting net HC(m) embedded in Fs(φ)).
To summarize, all the features ofMeml(Φ) are: V ∪ V ′ ∪W ∪ P ∪ D ∪A ∪ B ∪ {U1, U2}.
The CP-nets ofMeml(Φ) are:
• N eml1 is composed by a net Fs(φ) with its features, links, CP tables, and a direct net D(γ) (see Section 5.1),
where γ is defined over the set of features V ′ ∪ B and assigns non-overlined values to all of them.
• N eml2 is similar to net N eml1 , with the only differences that features U1 and U2 are exchanged, and the CP
tables of N eml2 are adjusted to reflect this change.
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• N eml3 = 〈FNeml3 , ENeml3 〉 is as follows (see Figure 12 for a schematic representation of the links). Links of
N eml3 are the following:
– for each xi ∈ X, {{V Ti , V ′i }, {V Fi , V ′i }} ⊂ ENeml3 ;
– a disjunctive interconnecting HC(|V ′|+ |W|+ |P|+ |D|+ |A|) over feature set B which is connected
to the features in V ′ ∪W ∪ P ∪ D ∪A;
– {{B,U1}, {U1, U2}} ⊂ ENeml3 .
CP tables of N eml3 are the following:
– features F ∈ (V ∪W ∪ P ∪ D ∪A) have the CP tables f  f ;
– for each variable xi ∈ X, feature V ′i ∈ V ′ has the CP table
vTi ∧ vFi v′i  v′i
else v′i  v′i
;
– features in B of the interconnecting net have the usual CP tables;
– U1 has the CP table
b u1  u1
b u1  u1 ;
– U2 has the CP table
u1 u2  u2
u1 u2  u2 .
• N eml4 is equal to net N eml3 ;
• N eml5 is composed by a link from U1 to U2, and a direct net D(γ), where γ is defined over all features but
U1 and U2, and assigns non-overlined values to all of them. The other CP tables of N eml5 are:
– feature U1 has the CP table u1  u1 ;
– feature U2 has the CP table
u1 u2  u2
u1 u2  u2 .
• N eml6 is characterized by having a link from feature U2 to any other feature. The CP tables of N eml6 are:
– feature U2 has the CP table u2  u2 ;
– features F different from U2 have the CP table
u2 f  f
u2 f  f .
Observe thatMeml(Φ) is acyclic, binary, its indegree is three, and can be computed in polynomial time from
φ. Moreover, the class of mCP-nets {Meml(Φ)}Φ derived from formulas Φ of the specified kind and according to
the reduction shown above is polynomially connected. It is possible to show that Φ = (∃X)(∀Y )¬φ(X,Y ) is
valid if and only ifMeml(Φ) has a majority optimal outcome.
Lemma 5.11. Let Φ = (∃X)(∀Y )¬φ(X,Y ) be a quantified Boolean formula, where φ(X,Y ) is a 3CNF Boolean
formula, defined over two disjoint sets X and Y of Boolean variables. Then, Φ is valid if and only ifMeml(Φ)
has a majority optimal outcome.
Proof (sketch). The intuition at the base of the proof is to put in relationship truth assignments over the variable
set X with outcomes ofMeml(Φ). In particular, given an assignment σX over X, the associated outcome is βσX ,
where σX is encoded over the feature set V in the usual way, and all other features have non-overlined values.
We show first that outcomes not in the form of a βσX are not majority optimal. Then, we show that if there
is an assignment σX such that (∀Y )¬φ(X/σX , Y ) is valid, then βσX is majority optimal. On the other hand,
if there is no assignment σX for which (∀Y )¬φ(X/σX , Y ) is valid, then none of the outcomes βσX is majority
optimal. Details of the proof are given at page 34.
We now prove that deciding whether an mCP-net has a majority optimal outcome is ΣP2 -hard.
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Theorem 5.12. LetM be an mCP-net. Then, deciding whether there is a majority optimal outcome inM is
ΣP2 -hard. Hardness holds even on polynomially connected classes of acyclic binary mCP-nets with indegree at
most three and at most six agents.
Proof. We prove the hardness of Exists-Majority-Optimal by showing a reduction from QBFCNF2,∀,¬. Let
Φ = (∃X)(∀Y )¬φ(X,Y ) be an instance of QBFCNF2,∀,¬, and consider the 6CP-netMeml(Φ). By Lemma 5.11, Φ is
a “yes”-instance of QBFCNF2,∀,¬ if and only if there is majority optimal outcome inMeml(Φ).
By combining the two above results, we immediately conclude that deciding the existence of majority optimal
outcomes over polynomially connected classes of acyclic mCP-nets is ΣP2 -complete.
Corollary 5.13. Let C be a polynomially connected class of acyclic mCP-nets. Let M ∈ C be an mCP-net.
Then, deciding whether there is a majority optimal outcome inM is ΣP2 -complete.
5.4 Complexity of majority optimums on mCP-nets
We now focus on majority optimum outcomes. In particular, the problems analyzed are deciding whether an
outcome is majority optimum, and deciding whether an mCP-net has a majority optimum outcome. We first
consider the problem of deciding whether an outcome is majority optimum in an mCP-net. We prove that this
problem is ΠP2 -complete. More formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Is-Majority-Optimum
Instance: An mCP-netM, and an outcome α ∈ OM.
Question: Is α majority optimum inM?
The following result shows that, on preference profiles represented via an NP-representations scheme, deciding
whether an outcome is majority optimum is feasible in ΠP2 .
Theorem 5.14. Let P be a preference profile defined over the same combinatorial domain and represented
via an NP-representation scheme, and let α be an outcome. Deciding whether α is majority optimum in P is
feasible in ΠP2 .
Proof. We prove the statement by showing that deciding whether α is not majority optimum in P is feasible in
ΣP2 . If α is majority optimum, then there is an outcome β such that α 6majP β. Therefore, in order to prove
that α is not majority optimum, it suffices to guess β, and then check that α 6majP β. Observe that guessing
β requires an NP machine, and then checking α 6majP β is feasible in co-NP (see Theorem 5.4), which can be
carried out by an oracle. Therefore, the overall procedure is feasible in ΣP2 .
To prove the ΠP2 -hardness of Is-Majority-Optimum, we use a reduction from QBFCNF2,∀,¬. Consider the
following construction. Let Φ = (∃X)(∀Y )¬φ(X,Y ) be a quantified formula where φ(X,Y ) is a 3CNF Boolean
formula defined over two disjoint sets X = {x1, . . . , xnX} and Y = {y1, . . . , ynY } of Boolean variables, and whose
set of clauses is C = {c1, . . . , cm}. From φ(X,Y ), we define the 3CP-netMimm(Φ) = 〈N imm1 ,N imm2 ,N imm3 〉 in
the following way.
The features ofMimm(Φ) are:
• all the features of a net Fs(φ) (defined in Section 5.1) in which, in this case, we distinguish two variable
feature sets V = {V Ti , V Fi | xi ∈ X} and W = {WTi ,WFi | yi ∈ Y } (recall that P and D are the sets of
literal and clause features, respectively, and A is the set of features of the conjunctive interconnecting net
embedded in Fs(φ));
• all the features of set V ′ = {V ′i | xi ∈ X};
• all the features of the set B which are the features Bi of a disjunctive interconnecting net (defined in
Section 4.1) HD(|V ′|+ |W|+ |P|+ |D|+ |A|) and its apex is feature B (observe that features Bi are distinct
from features Ai of the conjunctive interconnecting net HC(m) embedded in Fs(φ)).
To summarize, all the features ofMimm(Φ) are: V ∪ V ′ ∪W ∪ P ∪ D ∪A ∪ B ∪ {U1, U2}.
The CP-nets ofMimm(Φ) are:
• N imm1 is composed by a net Fs(φ) with its features, links, and CP tables, and a direct net D(γ) (see
Section 5.1), where γ is defined over features in V ′ ∪ B and assigns non-overlined values to all of them.
• N imm2 = D(α), with α defined over all the features of Mimm(Φ), and having overlined values only for
features U1 and U2.
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• N imm3 = 〈FN imm3 , EN imm3 〉 is as follows (see Figure 12 for a schematic representation of the links of N eml3 ,
which is equivalent to N imm3 ). Links of N imm3 are the following:
– for each xi ∈ X, {{V Ti , V ′i }, {V Fi , V ′i }} ⊂ EN imm3 ;
– a disjunctive interconnecting HC(|V ′|+ |W|+ |P|+ |D|+ |A|) over feature set B which is connected
to the features in V ′ ∪W ∪ P ∪ D ∪A;
– {{B,U1}, {U1, U2}} ⊂ EN imm3 .
CP tables of N imm3 are the following:
– features F ∈ (V ∪W ∪ P ∪ D ∪A) have the CP tables f  f ;
– for each variable xi ∈ X, feature V ′i ∈ V ′ has the CP table
vTi ∧ vFi v′i  v′i
else v′i  v′i
;
– features in B of the interconnecting net have the usual CP tables;
– U1 has the CP table
b u1  u1
b u1  u1 ;
– U2 has the CP table
u1 u2  u2
u1 u2  u2 .
Observe thatMimm(Φ) is acyclic, binary, its indegree is three, and can be computed in polynomial time from
φ. Moreover, the class of mCP-nets {Mimm(Φ)}Φ derived from formulas Φ of the specified kind and according to
the reduction shown above is polynomially connected. The following result shows that Φ = (∃X)(∀Y )¬φ(X,Y )
is valid if and only if a particular outcome ofMimm(Φ) is majority optimum.
Lemma 5.15. Let Φ = (∃X)(∀Y )¬φ(X,Y ) be a quantified Boolean formula, where φ(X,Y ) is a 3CNF Boolean
formula, defined over two disjoint sets X and Y of Boolean variables. Then, Φ is valid if and only ifMimm(Φ)
does not have a majority optimum outcome. In particular, whenMimm(Φ) has a majority optimum outcome it
is the outcome α ∈ OMimm(Φ) assigning overlined values only to features U1 and U2.
Proof (sketch). The intuition at the base of the proof is to put in relationship truth assignments over the variable
set X with outcomes ofMimm(Φ). In particular, given an assignment σX over X, the associated outcome is βσX ,
where σX is encoded over the feature set V in the usual way, and all other features have non-overlined values.
We show first that α majority dominates any other outcome β that is not in the form of a βσX outcome, and
hence none of them is majority optimum. Moreover, for all such outcomes βσX , βσX does not majority dominates
α, and hence, again, none of them is majority optimum. So, only α is candidate to be majority optimum. Then,
we show that if there is an assignment σX such that (∀Y )¬φ(X/σX , Y ) is valid, then α 6majMimm(Φ) βσX , and
hence α is not majority optimum, which implies thatMimm(Φ) does not have any majority optimum outcome.
On the other hand, if there is no assignment σX for which (∀Y )¬φ(X/σX , Y ) is valid, then, for all the outcomes
βσX , α majMimm(Φ) βσX , which implies that α is majority optimum. Details of the proof are given at page 38.
The next result shows that deciding whether an outcome is majority optimum in an mCP-net is ΠP2 -hard.
Theorem 5.16. LetM be an mCP-net, and let α ∈ OM be an outcome. Then, deciding whether α is majority
optimum inM is ΠP2 -hard. Hardness holds even on polynomially connected classes of acyclic binary mCP-nets
with indegree at most three and at most three agents.
Proof. We prove the statement by showing that deciding whether α is not majority optimum is ΣP2 -hard, and
we do this by exhibiting a reduction from QBFCNF2,∀,¬ to the complement problem to Is-Majority-Optimum. Let
Φ = (∃X)(∀Y )¬φ(X,Y ) be an instance of QBFCNF2,∀,¬, and consider the 3CP-netMimm(Φ), and the outcome α in
which only the values of features U1 and U2 are overlined. By Lemma 5.15, Φ is a “yes”-instance of QBFCNF2,∀,¬ if
and only if α is not majority optimum inMimm(Φ).
Note that, with respect to the number of agents, the above result is optimal. Indeed, since majority dominance
and Pareto dominance are equivalent on mCP-nets with m ≤ 2, it is not possible to show the ΠP2 -hardness of
Is-Majority-Optimum on mCP-nets with m < 3.
By combining the two previous results, we immediately conclude that deciding whether an outcome is
majority optimum over polynomially connected classes of acyclic mCP-nets is ΠP2 -complete.
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Corollary 5.17. Let C be a polynomially connected class of acyclic mCP-nets. LetM∈ C be an mCP-net, and
let α ∈ OM be an outcome. Then, deciding whether α is majority optimum inM is ΠP2 -complete.
To conclude, we study the complexity of deciding whether an mCP-net has a majority optimum outcome.
We show that the problem is ΠP2 -hard and belongs to DP2 . More formally, consider the following problem.
Problem: Exists-Majority-Optimum
Instance: An mCP-netM.
Question: DoesM have a majority optimum outcome?
We prove that deciding whether a preference profile represented via an NP-representation scheme has a
majority optimum outcome is feasible in DP2 . The following lemma is an intermediate result to show the
membership in DP2 .
Lemma 5.18. Let P be a preference profile defined over the same combinatorial domain and represented via
an NP-representation scheme. Then, deciding whether P does not have majority optimal outcomes that are not
also majority optimum is feasible in ΠP2 .
Proof. To prove the statement of the lemma, we show that the complement task to the one in the statement is
feasible in ΣP2 . First, we guess two different outcomes α and β, which is feasible in NP. Then, through a co-NP
oracle call we check whether α is actually majority optimal (see Theorem 5.7), then through another oracle call
in co-NP we check that α 6majP β (see Theorem 5.4). If the answer to the latter oracle call is “yes”, then it
means that α is a majority optimal outcome that is not also majority optimum (because α does not majority
dominate β). To conclude, observe that the overall procedure is feasible in ΣP2 .
Theorem 5.19. Let P be a preference profile defined over the same combinatorial domain and represented via
an NP-representation scheme. Then, deciding whether P has a majority optimum outcome is feasible in DP2 .
Proof. Let O be a combinatorial domain. Let A be the set of all the preference profiles over O having at least a
majority optimal outcome. Let B be the set of all the preference profiles over O not having majority optimal
outcomes that are not also majority optimum (observe that in B there might be profiles with no majority optimal
outcome at all, and profiles having a majority optimal outcome that is also majority optimum). Clearly, the
intersection A ∩B is the set of all the preference profiles over O having a majority optimum outcome. Observe
that, if we focus only on NP-representations schemes, then set A can be decided in ΣP2 (see Theorem 5.10), and
set B can be decided in ΠP2 (see Lemma 5.18). Therefore, deciding whether P has a majority optimum outcome
is feasible in DP2 .
For a lower bound of the problem Exists-Majority-Optimum we can exploit the construction used to show
the lower bound of Is-Majority-Optimum, and obtain the following theorem, which proves that on mCP-nets
deciding the existence of a majority optimum outcome is ΠP2 -hard.
Theorem 5.20. Let M be an mCP-net. Then, deciding whether M has a majority optimum outcome is
ΠP2 -hard. Hardness holds even on polynomially connected classes of acyclic binary mCP-nets with indegree at
most three and at most three agents.
Proof. We prove the statement by showing a reduction from QBFCNF2,∀,¬ to the complement problem to Exists-
Majority-Optimum. Let Φ = (∃X)(∀Y )¬φ(X,Y ) be an instance of QBFCNF2,∀,¬, and consider the 3CP-net
Mimm(Φ). By Lemma 5.15, Φ is a “yes”-instance of QBFCNF2,∀,¬ if and only if Mimm(Φ) has not a majority
optimum outcome.
By combining the two above results, we immediately conclude that deciding the existence of majority optimum
outcomes over polynomially connected classes of acyclic mCP-nets is in DP2 and ΠP2 -hard.
Corollary 5.21. Let C be a polynomially connected class of acyclic mCP-nets. Let M ∈ C be an mCP-net.
Then, deciding whetherM has a majority optimum outcome is ΠP2 -hard and in DP2 .
6 Related work
In this section, we describe the larger context of this work in the literature, especially its relationship to previous
work on compact representations of preferences, global and sequential voting, and the notion of O-legality.
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6.1 Compact representations of preferences
The preferences of agents can be represented in different ways, and preference (representation) models can
essentially be divided into quantitative and qualitative ones [8, 45]. The former preference models associate with
each outcome a numerical value, which is the value of a utility function, and preferences between outcomes are
evaluated by comparing the utility values. The latter preference models provide a (not necessarily complete)
order over the outcomes, which can be represented in multiple ways, e.g., via a plain sequence of outcomes, or,
more generally, via a binary relation over the outcomes, i.e., a set of ordered pairs of outcomes, in which the first
outcome of the pair is considered preferred to the second. The key point of qualitative preferences is that there
is no precise quantification of the utility associated with the outcomes. For this reason, it has been argued in the
literature that qualitative preference are easier to be stated by humans [8, 12], as it is not necessary to estimate
the utility values, which can be quite challenging. In this paper, we focus only on qualitative preference models,
encoding preference relations.
A preference model is extensive, if for any preference relation R that it is capable to represent, each outcome
of the domain of R appears explicitly at least once in its representation of R. This implies that the size
of its representation of R is at least linear in the number of outcomes of R. So, for example, a sequence
of all the outcomes, or listing all the pairs of a preference relation, are both extensive representations. By
definition, the number of possible outcomes in combinatorial domains is exponential in the number of features.
Hence, the extensive representation of agents’ preferences over combinatorial domains becomes quickly infeasible
and unrealistic when the number of features is more than just a few. For this reason, compact formalisms
to represent combinatorial preferences are needed [44, 45, 48]. An ideal compact representation scheme for
combinatorial preferences would be one such that the space required for the representation is polynomial in the
number of the features (and not in the number of the outcomes, like for extensive representations). Clearly, for
information-theoretic reasons, it is not possible to have a preference model to compactly represent any possible
preference relation over a combinatorial domain. Indeed, for a combinatorial domain characterized by n features
of two values each, i.e., binary features, the number of all possible (complete) relations is (2n)!, which is O(22n).
Hence, no preference model could ever represent all the possible preference relations using only polynomial space
in n [48]. Nonetheless, if we want to represent preference relations showing particular structures or patterns, then
it is possible to take advantage of these patterns and “decompose” the relation to summarize it into a concise
representation. In the literature, there has been considerable work on exploiting the structure of preferences to
appropriately decompose them, and, e.g., Lang [45] gives a survey of different logical languages for compact
preference representation (see also [8] for more references).
Among the preferences’ structural patterns exploited to achieve compact representations, the (conditional)
preference independence of the features is one of the most studied (see [8, 18, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 75] and references
therein). Intuitively, the (conditional) preferential independence of the features implies that the preference
relation between outcomes varying on specific features can be influenced by the values of some features and can
be totally independent from the values of some other features. When features are (conditionally) preferentially
independent, it roughly means that portions of the structure of the preference relation are replicated throughout
the preference relation. Therefore, these patterns in the preferences can be “factorised” to save space in the
representation.
In the literature, (conditional) ceteris paribus preference statements have been proposed several times to
compactly represent preferences with (conditional) preferential independencies among (sets of) features [8, 45].
Moreover, a preference representation scheme should capture statements that are natural for agents to assess,
and (conditional) ceteris paribus preference statements have several times been argued to be intuitive for users,
as they resemble the way in which humans express their preferences and act upon them [7, 8, 37, 38].
Ceteris paribus means “all else being equal”, and ceteris paribus statements were classically defined to be
non-conditional [37]. Given a set of features V ⊆ F , a non-conditional ceteris paribus preference statement
sounds like: “Outcomes varying over V , and all else being equal, are ranked according to the following preference
relation restricted over V”. For example, a non-conditional ceteris paribus preference statement is “I prefer a
round table to a square one, all else being equal” [37]. In this example, the set V contains the feature “shape” (of
the table). Observe that, here, the “all else being equal” does not refer to the fact that the values of the other
features determine the preference relation restricted over V. Instead, it means that the given ceteris paribus
statement allows to compare outcomes varying only on V: outcomes varying over V and other features cannot
be compared via the given statement.
Boutilier et al. [7, 8] extended the idea of ceteris paribus statements to conditional ceteris paribus preference
statements. In this case, given two disjoint sets of features V,Z ⊆ F , a conditional ceteris paribus preference
statement sounds like: “Given the specific instantiation γ of values for the features in Z, outcomes varying over
V, and all else being equal, are ranked according to the following preference relation restricted over V”. For
example, a conditional ceteris paribus preference statement could be “Given that the main course of the dinner
is meat, I prefer a red wine to a white one, all else being equal”. Here, Z contains the feature “main course”,
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while V contains the feature “wine”.
Among the representation schemes proposed in the literature based on (conditional) ceteris paribus statements,
one using propositional logics was proposed by Lang [45], while Boutilier et al. [7, 8] proposed CP-nets; for
other representations based on (conditional) ceteris paribus statements, see references in [8, 45]. More details on
CP-nets are given in the introduction and in the preliminaries.
6.2 Global and sequential voting
The graphical structure of CP-nets shows that, in general, combinatorial preferences may exhibit dependencies
between features. Dependencies are certainly a critical characteristic to model, especially to attain compact
representations, however, they can become troublesome when combinatorial preferences are aggregated. Whether
dependencies are actually problematic or not depends on the specific ways in which agents’ votes are collected.
These specific ways in which votes are collected are called voting protocols [19]. A voting protocol characterizes
how a voting rule is implemented, i.e., it determines which information is elicited from the agents, and when this
is done. In the literature, a number of different voting protocols for combinatorial vote have been considered (see,
e.g., [18, 43, 48] and references therein). Two of them are global and sequential voting [18, 43, 46, 47, 48, 75].
In global voting, agents’ preferences over the entire combinatorial domain are collected at the same time, and
then a voting rule is applied to the entire preference profile to select the winner(s). In case of (m)CP-nets, global
voting consists in the agents communicating their whole CP-nets for vote aggregation. In sequential voting,
votes are collected feature-by-feature. In particular, agents express at the same time their preferences over the
individual features, and votes for the different features are collected sequentially in consecutive steps. In this
case, a voting rule determines the winning value v for a feature, and, most importantly, agents are informed
about v before the next feature is considered for voting in the protocol. Note that sometimes, in sequential
voting, instead of voting for a sequence of single features, agents may be asked in a step of the protocol to
express their preferences over the combined values (i.e., the value vectors) of a set of features (see, e.g., [1, 75]).
Global voting is the protocol of the voting semantics in mCP-nets.
Dependencies are not an issue in global voting, because agents communicate their preferences over the
entire (exponential) combinatorial domain (or the entire CP-nets, if CP-nets are used to represent the agents’
preferences), and hence all the information needed for the aggregation is available. However, global voting
can be expensive to implement and evaluate, especially if extensive representations are adopted or preference
relations are extensively unfolded from the compact representation before any further processing. Strictly
speaking, from a theoretical perspective the computational complexity of aggregating preferences represented via
extensive schemes can be lower than then complexity of performing the same task over compactly represented
preferences. However, this computational simplification is artificial, because the computational complexity of
a problem is evaluated relative to the size of the input. For extensive representations, the input is huge, and
hence the computational complexity of problems over this kind of input can be low. Nevertheless, processing
input of remarkable size can be computationally challenging. The computational burden of global voting can
be limited by adopting sequential voting. A benefit of sequential voting over global voting is lowering the
communication complexity, i.e., the amount of information needed to be exchanged by the agents to implement
the protocol [18, 19, 48]. In sequential voting, agents are enquired in consecutive steps about their preferences for
individual features, therefore the information required to be exchanged is only the preferences “projected” over
individual features. However, feature dependencies can be quite detrimental for sequential voting, to the point
that sub-optimal outcomes are selected—examples of this phenomenon are called multiple election paradoxes—or
agents can experience regret after voting [18, 43, 46, 47, 48, 75]. Intuitively, paradoxes may occur in sequential
voting, because votes over the different features are collected separately, and this can clash with the different
individual preferential dependencies that agents may have between features—more specifically, it might be the
case that agents have to vote on a feature whose preferences depend on features for which it has not been voted
yet [15].
Lacy and Niou [43] showed that these paradoxes in sequential voting can be (partly) avoided if the considered
preferences are separable, i.e., they do not have dependencies among features. Intuitively, when represented via
CP-nets, combinatorial preferences without dependencies among features do not have any edge between vertices.
Clearly, this is a very strong assumption, and it is unlikely to be met in practice [46, 47, 75, 76].
6.3 Overcoming multiple election paradoxes via O-legality
To overcome the strong limitation imposed by preference separability, Lang [46] proposed and investigated a
weaker structural restriction of preferences, called O-legality, which preserves the nice properties of sequential
voting (when evaluated over separable preferences) on a wider class of combinatorial preferences. Intuitively, a
preference profile is O-legal, if the dependencies among the features for all the agents comply with a common
sequence. More formally, if O = (F1, . . . , Fm) is a sequence of all the features of the combinatorial domain, a
28
preference profile P is O-legal, if for any agent A and any two features Fi and Fj , if Fi precedes Fj in O, then
A’s preferences for Fi do not depend on Fj ’s value [76]. The concept of O-legality has an immediate translation
over CP-nets. Indeed, a profile of (preferences represented via) CP-nets is O-legal, if O is a topological order for
all the CP-nets’ graphs of the profile. Observe that the existence of a topological order for the features of a
CP-net imposes that the graph of the CP-net is acyclic.
The intuitiveness of CP-nets to model combinatorial preferences, together with the convenient characterization
of O-legality in CP-nets, has largely encouraged the study of sequential voting in O-legal (and acyclic) CP-nets.
In a first group of works, the sequential composition of the voting rule assumed that a feature order was given
beforehand (and the voting rule was defined upon the given order) [46, 47, 75]. Next, this idea was generalized
by assuming that the sequential voting rule was not defined given the specific order [76], however, the existence
of a shared topological order among the features was anyway required. A study on how well solutions computed
via sequential voting approximate the winning outcomes obtained via global voting was presented in [20]. Also
various other works considered O-legal CP-nets (see, e.g., [22, 30, 53, 58, 59]). Among them, an interesting
approach to preference aggregation over O-legal CP-nets was proposed in [22], where “probabilistic” CP-nets
were used to represent the result of the aggregation.
6.4 Going beyond O-legality
However, also O-legality is somewhat demanding, because it imposes that there are no “inversions” in the
preference dependencies. For example, if in a profile of CP-nets encoding preferences for a dinner there were an
agent whose choice of the main dish influences the choice of the wine and an other agent whose choice of the
wine influences the choice of the main dish, then those CP-nets would not be O-legal. (Observe that the profile
of CP-nets in Figure 2 is not O-legal). Hence, also assuming O-legality is in the end quite restrictive [51, 68, 77].
To go beyond the restrictions imposed by O-legality, different approaches were proposed.
One of these approaches is generalizing the idea of sequential voting. A voting agenda specifies the order in
which the features have to be considered in sequential voting. If the voting agenda does not clash with any of the
feature dependencies of all the agents, then it is possible to avoid multiple election paradoxes. In particular, if O
is a shared topological order of the features of the CP-nets in a profile, then O is a voting agenda compatible
with the feature dependencies of all the agents. A generalization of this idea is to have a sequence of elections
for sets of joint features that cannot be decomposed due to preferential dependencies of some of the agents. In
this way, the problem can be shifted to deciding suitable generalized voting agendas that do not clash with the
agents’ feature dependencies [1].
Another approach to overcome the limitations imposed by O-legality is hypercubewise preference aggre-
gation [77]. This family of voting rules decomposes the preference aggregation task into two phases: first, a
(hypercubewise) dominance graph is built by applying local voting rules to set of outcomes differing only for the
value of a single specific feature (these outcomes are the neighboring vertices of the extended preference graph of
CP-nets, which, in case of binary features, constitute a hypercube—this is where the name of the voting rule
comes from); and then the winners are chosen from the hypercubewise dominance graph via choice sets functions,
which may select dominating or undominated outcomes in the graph. The idea of the hypercubewise aggregation
is at the base of the definition of the hypercubewise Condorcet winner (i.e., the hypercubewise majority winner,
which is the outcome majority dominating all its neighbors) [21, 77], also called the local Condercet winner, in
which the hypercubewise dominance graph is obtained via majority voting. The definition of the hypercubewise
Condorcet winner is different from the definition of the standard, or global, Condorcet winner (the majority
optimum outcome, in this paper) obtained from global voting [21, 77]. Also the dominance relation inferred
from the hypercubewise dominance graph is different from the standard majority dominance relation obtained
via global voting [51]. In [51], also other relations between local and global Condorcet winners are investigated.
It was shown that deciding the existence of hypercubewise Condorcet winners is NP-complete [21, 51].
A third approach proposes, similarly to the previous, to define new voting rules that can be applied also
over profiles of non O-legal CP-nets. These new rules select the outcomes minimizing the total value of a loss
function evaluated over the profile of CP-nets [67, 68].
6.5 Analysis of global voting over CP-nets
Although the proposed approaches can deal with CP-net profiles that are not O-legal, they do not address the
complexity analysis of global voting over (not necessarily O-legal) acyclic CP-nets. In fact, global voting over
non-O-legal acyclic CP-nets has not received as much attention as sequential voting, although it was explicitly
stated in the literature that a theoretical comparison between global and sequential voting would have been
highly promising [46].
The first work studying global voting over (not necessarily O-legal) acyclic CP-nets was [64], in which
mCP-nets were defined. Recall that the group dominance semantics of mCP-nets is global voting over a profile
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of CP-nets. Voting schemes over mCP-nets were considered from an algorithmic perspective in [64], which gave
a computational insight for global voting over CP-nets. However, most of the algorithms considered in [64] were
brute-force. Therefore, these algorithms gave only EXPTIME upper bounds for most of the global voting tasks
over CP-nets, and no hardness result was provided in [64].
Algorithms exploiting SAT solvers to compute Pareto and majority optimal outcomes according to global
voting over profiles of (not necessarily O-legal) acyclic CP-nets were proposed in [50] and [49], respectively. A
SAT solver is used in [51] to compute, over profiles of even cyclic (and therefore also non O-legal) CP-nets,
majority optimal and majority optimum outcomes according to global voting, starting from hypercubewise weak
Condorcet winners. The approach of [51] was subsequently extended in [52] to consider also the possibility of
multi-valued and incomplete CP-nets.
Despite the mentioned works advanced the study of global voting over (not necessarily O-legal) acyclic CP-nets,
they still did not provide precise complexity results. As mentioned in the introduction, the precise complexity of
these problems was actually reported as an open problem multiple times in the literature [46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 67].
Our work is the first in the literature tackling directly the complexity analysis of dominance in mCP-nets (and
hence the complexity of global voting over CP-nets).
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have carried out a thorough complexity analysis of the Pareto and majority semantics in
mCP-nets. Given the specific definitions of group dominance in mCP-nets, these results characterizes also the
complexity of Pareto and majority global voting over CP-nets, which was missing and asked for in the literature
various times. Unlike what is often assumed in the literature, in this work, we have not restricted the profiles of
CP-nets to be O-legal, which makes the results achieved here more general. For the Pareto and the majority
voting schemes, we have analyzed the problems of deciding dominance, optimal and optimum outcomes, and the
existence of optimal and optimum outcomes. We have shown completeness results for most cases, which means
that we have provided tight lower bounds for problems that (up to date) did not have any explicit lower bound
transcending the obvious hardness due to the dominance test over the underlying CP-nets. Our hardness results
are given for polynomially connected classes of binary acyclic (m)CP-nets. This means that our hardness results
extend to classes of (m)CP-nets encompassing the CP-nets here considered, and in particular also to general
mCP-nets with partial CP-nets or multi-valued features. The various problems analyzed here have been put at
various levels of the polynomial hierarchy, and some of them are even tractable (in P or LOGSPACE), which is
quite interesting given that for most of these tasks only EXPTIME upper-bounds were known in the literature.
There are various possible directions for further research. The lower bound for the problem of deciding
the existence of majority optimum outcomes does not match the upper bound (ΠP2 -hardness and membership
in DP2 , respectively). Hence, it would be interesting to close this gap and find the precise complexity of the
problem. Furthermore, characterizing the complexity of preference aggregation when partial CP-nets are allowed
to be part of mCP-nets would be interesting, since with (standard) CP-nets, indifference between outcomes
are not allowed. Having constraints on outcomes’s feasibility is another interesting direction of investigation.
Without any constraint, CP-nets model agents’ preferences when it is assumed that all outcomes are attainable.
However, this is not always the case. During the aggregation precess, we should take into account what outcomes
are feasible. For example, to decide whether an outcome is majority dominated by another, we should check
that the latter is actually feasible. It will be interesting studying the case in which constraints are issued over
the outcome domain prior the preference aggregation and the case in which constraints are considered after
the aggregation. A similar idea characterized the solution concepts in NTU cooperative games defined via
constraints [32, 33]. This approach could be merged with the definition of constrained CP-nets [9, 62], Finally, it
will also be interesting investigating structural restrictions on the structure of CP-nets, in the spirit of what
was done in [13, 31, 34, 35, 39], to identify broader classes of CP-nets where the dominance test is tractable,
whereas, in general, over acyclic CP-nets the dominance test is NP-hard.
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A Detailed proofs
A.1 Proofs for Section 3
Lemma 3.1. Let φ(X) be a Boolean formula in 3CNF defined over a set X of Boolean variables, and let σX
be an assignment on X. Let ασX be the outcome of F(φ) encoding σX on the feature set V, and assigning
non-overlined values to all other features, and let β be the outcome assigning overlined values to all and only
variable and clause features. Then:
(1) There is an extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β F(φ) ασX .
(2) There is no extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β ./F(φ) ασX .
Proof. We first prove (1).
(⇒) Assume that there is an extension σ′X of σX to X satisfying φ(X). To prove that β F(φ) ασX we show
that there is an improving flipping sequence from ασX to β.
Recall that σ′X is a complete assignment over X, and that if σX is complete, then σ′X = σX . For each
variable xi not defined in σX , if σ′X [xi] = true, then we flip feature V Ti from vTi to vTi , analogously if
σ′X [xi] = false, then we flip feature V Fi from vFi to vFi .
For all literals `j,k evaluating to true in σ′X , we flip the corresponding literal features Pj,k from pj,k to pj,k.
Since σ′X is a satisfying assignment, for each clause cj of φ, there is at least a literal `j,k evaluating to
true in σ′X . For this reason, given any clause feature Dj , at this point of the flipping sequence, there is at
least one literal feature Pj,k with value pj,k, and hence we can flip Dj from dj to dj . We can do this for
every clause feature.
Then, we flip to their overlined value all variable features that have not been flipped until now. By the
definition of the CP tables of literal features, we can flip all features Pj,k having value pj,k to pj,k, because
in the outcome having been built so far through the flips shown above, for all pairs of features (V Ti , V Fi ),
their values are vTi vFi .
To conclude, observe that the obtained outcome is exactly β, and hence β F(φ) ασX .
(⇐) Assume that β F(φ) ασX . We show that there is an extension σ′X of σX to X satisfying φ(X). Since
β F(φ) ασX , there is an improving flipping sequence ρ : γ0 → . . . → γz from γ0 = ασX to γz = β.
Consider the truth assignment σ′X built as follows: If there is an index q such that γq[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi ,
then σ′X [xi] = true; and if there is an index q such that γq[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi , then σ′X [xi] = false.
We first show that σ′X is consistent, complete, and an extension of σX to X. Observe that, by the definition
of the CP tables of variable features, and the fact that those features have no parents, once a variable
feature is flipped to its overlined value, it cannot be flipped back. Therefore, it cannot be the case that
there are indices q and r for which there are variable features V Ti and V Fi such that γq[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi and
γr[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi . Hence, σ′X is consistent. Moreover, we claim that, for any variable xi, there is always
an index q such that γq[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi or γq[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi , which implies that σ′X is complete. Indeed,
if xi has a value in σX , then the index q that we are looking for is q = 0 (because either γ0[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi
or γ0[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi , by the definition of γ0 = ασX ). Observe that this, along with the consistency of
σ′X proven above, implies that σ′X [xi] = σX [xi] for each variable xi having a truth value in σX . On the
other hand, if xi has not a value in σX , then, since γ0[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi and γz[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi , it must be
the case that there is an index q > 0 such that γq[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi or γq[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi . Hence, σ′X is
complete. To conclude, by all the properties above, σ′X is also an extension of σX to X.
We now prove that σ′X satisfies φ(X) by showing that σ′X satisfies all clauses of φ(X).
Let cj be a clause of φ(X), and consider clause feature Dj . Because γ0[Dj ] = dj and γz[Dj ] = dj , there
is an index t such that γt[Dj ] = dj , γt+1[Dj ] = dj , and γt →Dj γt+1. Since flipping Dj has to be an
improving flip, it must be the case that there is a literal feature Pj,k such that γt[Pj,k] = pj,k. Therefore,
since γ0[Pj,k] = pj,k, there is an index s < t such that γs[Pj,k] = pj,k, γs+1[Pj,k] = pj,k, and γs →Pj,k γs+1.
Now there are two cases: either (a) `j,k = xi, or (b) `j,k = ¬xi. For (a), since flipping Pj,k has to be an
improving flip, it must be the case that γs[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi , therefore σ′X [xi] = true, and hence σ′X satisfies
cj . For (b), again since flipping Pj,k has to be an improving flip, it must be the case that γs[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi ,
therefore σ′X [xi] = false and hence σ′X satisfies cj .
Therefore, σ′X satisfies all clauses of φ, and hence σ′X is an extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X).
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We now prove (2). We know that β ./F(φ) ασX if and only if ασX 6F(φ) β and β 6F(φ) ασX . First, observe
that ασX 6F(φ) β is always true, as there is no improving flipping sequence from β to ασX . Indeed, the values
of variable features in β cannot be flipped to their non-overlined values according to their CP tables in F(φ),
because they are the most preferred values and variable features do not have parents. So, β ./F(φ) ασX if
and only if β 6F(φ) ασX . Hence, showing that there is no extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only
if β ./F(φ) ασX is equivalent to showing that there is no extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if
β 6F(φ) ασX . However, we have already shown this in (1).
A.2 Proofs for Section 4
Lemma 4.5. Let φ(X) be a 3CNF Boolean formula, and let α be the outcome ofMipo(φ) assigning non-overlined
values to all features. Then, φ(X) is satisfiable if and only if α is not Pareto optimal inMipo(φ).
Proof. To prove the statement of the lemma, we first show the two following properties.
Property 4.5.(1). If φ(X) is unsatisfiable, and β ∈ OMipo(φ) is an outcome such that β 6= α, then β N ipo1 α
implies that β 6N ipo2 α, and β N ipo2 α implies that β 6N ipo1 α.
Proof. By inspection of the proof of Lemma 3.1, since φ is unsatisfiable, there is no improving flipping
sequence in N ipo1 that from α arrives to an outcome in which the values of all the clause features of the net
F(φ)a are overlined. For this reason, by the definition of the interconnecting net HC(m), in N ipo1 there is no
improving flipping sequence that from α arrives to an outcome in which the value of the apex of HC(m) is
overlined. This implies, moreover, that in N ipo1 there is no improving flipping sequence that from α arrives to
an outcome in which the value of any of the features of the net F(φ)b is overlined. So, any improving flipping
sequence in N ipo1 from α arrives to outcomes in which values of features of F(φ)a are overlined, while values
of feature of F(φ)b are non-overlined.
Symmetrically, since φ is unsatisfiable, any improving flipping sequence in N ipo2 from α arrives to outcomes
in which values of features of F(φ)a are non-overlined, while values of feature of F(φ)b are overlined.
Now, assume that β is such that β N ipo1 α, hence in N
ipo
1 there is an improving flipping sequence from
α to β. From what we have said, β is such that values of features of F(φ)a are overlined, while values of
feature of F(φ)b are non-overlined. Therefore, β cannot be reached through an improving flipping sequence
in N ipo2 . Thus, β 6N ipo2 α.
Symmetrically, it can be shown that if β N ipo2 α, then β 6N ipo1 α.
Property 4.5.(2). If φ(X) is satisfiable, then outcome β assigning overlined values to all variable and clause
features ofMipo(φ) and to all features of HC(m) is such that β N ipo1 α and β N ipo2 α.
Proof. Since φ is satisfiable, by inspection of the proof of Lemma 3.1, there is an improving flipping sequence
in N ipo1 that from α arrives to an outcome α1 in which the values of all variable and clause features of F(φ)a
are overlined. By definition of the interconnecting net HC(m), in N ipo1 there is also an improving flipping
sequence that from α1 arrives to an outcome α2 in which the values of all features (and also of the apex)
of HC(m) are overlined. This allows α2 to be further improved by a flipping sequence to an outcome α3 in
which the values of all variable and clause features of F(φ)b are overlined, because φ is satisfiable. Observe
that α3 = β.
Symmetrically, it can be shown that in N ipo2 there exists an improving flipping sequence from α to the
very same β. Therefore, β N ipo1 α and β N ipo2 α.
We now show that φ(X) is satisfiable if and only if α is not a Pareto optimal outcome ofMipo(φ).
(⇒) Assume that φ(X) is satisfiable. Then, by Property 4.5.(2), there is an outcome β that is preferred to α
by all agents ofMipo(φ). Therefore, β pMipo(φ) α, and hence α is not Pareto optimal inMipo(φ).
(⇐) Assume that φ(X) is not satisfiable. Then, by Property 4.5.(1), there is no outcome β that is preferred to
α by all agents ofMipo(φ). Therefore, α is Pareto optimal inMipo(φ).
A.3 Proofs for Section 5
Lemma 5.2. Let φ(X) be a Boolean formula in 3CNF defined over a set X of Boolean variables, and let σX
be an assignment on X. Let ασX be the outcome of Fs(φ) encoding σX on the feature set V, and assigning
non-overlined values to all other features. Let β be an outcome of Fs(φ) such that β[U1U2] = u1u2, assigning
any value to the features of V, and assigning non-overlined values to all other features. Then:
(1) There is an extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β Fs(φ) ασX ;
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(2) There is no extension of σX to X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β ./Fs(φ) ασX .
Proof. We first prove (1).
(⇒) Assume that there is an extension σ′X of σX to X satisfying φ(X). We show that β Fs(φ) ασX by
exhibiting an improving flipping sequence from ασX to β.
We claim that, by Lemma 3.1, outcome β (which is different from β) assigning overlined values to all
variable and clause features is such that β Fs(φ) ασX . Indeed, features in V ∪ P ∪ D are linked in Fs(φ)
through the very same links of a net F(φ). Moreover, the value u1 assigned to feature U1 in ασX selects in
the CP tables of features V ∪ P ∪ D specific preference rankings that are equivalent to those in the CP
tables of features V ∪ P ∪ D in F(φ). Now, since β Fs(φ) ασX , there is an improving flipping sequence
from ασX to β. Then, we can flip the values of all features of the interconnecting net HC(m) (including
the apex) and of U2. Now we flip the value of feature U1 from u1 to u1. Recall that in β, all variable
features have overlined values, and their values have not been flipped after outcome β was reached in the
improving flipping sequence. Therefore, since the value of U1 is u1, given the CP table of variable features,
we can flip features in V to any configuration of values (even leaving everything as it is), and in particular
we can flip them to match the values of features of V in β . Next, all literal features can be flipped to
their non-overlined values (recall that U1 has value u1 now). Then, we flip all clause features to their
non-overlined values, and after this, in the proper order, we can flip the features of the interconnecting net
to their non-overlined values. Observe that the obtained outcome is precisely β, and hence β Fs(φ) ασX .
(⇐) Assume that β Fs(φ) ασX . We show that there is an extension σ′X of σX to X satisfying φ(X). Since
β Fs(φ) ασX , there is an improving flipping sequence ρ : γ0 → . . .→ γz from γ0 = ασX to γz = β.
Since γ0[U1] = u1 and γz[U1] = u1, there must be an index s in which γs[U1] = u1, γs+1[U1] = u1, and
γs →U1 γs+1. Moreover, because U1 has no parents, in the sequence ρ, feature U1 can be flipped only once.
Therefore, for all p < s, αp[U1] = u1, and for all p > s, αp[U1] = u1.
We claim that we can assume w.l.o.g. that all variable features have overlined values in γs. Indeed, if
this is not the case, we can always modify as follows an improving flipping sequence ρ, from ασX to β, to
obtain an improving flipping sequence ρ′, from ασX to β, satisfying the required assumption. In particular,
consider all variable features F having non-overlined values just before feature U1 is flipped. We can flip
all of them before flipping U1 to u1, and, after having flipped U1, we can flip them all back to the values
they had before. Clearly, the new sequence satisfies the required assumption, and, moreover, it is still
improving, and it is still a sequence from ασX to β.
Consider the truth assignment σ′X built as follows: If there is an index p < s such that γp[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi ,
then σ′X [xi] = true; if there is an index p < s such that γp[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi , then σ′X [xi] = false.
We first show that σ′X is consistent, complete, and an extension of σX to X. Observe that, by the definition
of the CP tables of variable features, before the s-th step of the sequence, once a variable feature is flipped
to its overlined value, it cannot be flipped back (this may happen only after the s-th step). Therefore, it
cannot be the case that there are indices p < s and q < s for which there are variable features V Ti and V Fi
such that γp[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi and γq[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi . Hence, σ′X is consistent. Moreover, we claim that,
for any variable xi, there is always an index p < s such that γp[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi or γp[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi ,
which implies that σ′X is complete. Indeed, if xi has a value in σX , then the index p that we are looking
for is p = 0 (because either γ0[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi or γ0[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi , by the definition of γ0 = ασX ).
Observe that this and the consistency of σ′X proven above imply that σ′X [xi] = σx[xi] for each variable xi
having a truth value in σX . On the other hand, if xi has not a value in σX , then, since γ0[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi ,
and we are assuming that γs[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi , it must be the case that there is an index p < s such that
γp[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi or γp[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi . Hence, σ′X is complete. To conclude, by all the properties above,
σ′X is an extension of σX to X.
We now show that σ′X satisfies φ(X) by showing that σ′X satisfies all the clauses of φ(X).
Because γ0[U2] = u2 and γz[U2] = u2, there must be an index t such that γt[U2] = u2, γt+1[U2] = u2, and
γt →U2 γt+1. (Indices s and t are not in any particular relationship; it could be s < t but also t < s.) By
the definition of the CP tables, for γt →U2 γt+1 to be an improving flip, it must be the case that, for the
apex A of the interconnecting net, γt[A] = a. This requires that there is an index r < t, for which in γr all
clause features have their overlined values (because the conjunctive interconnecting net is linked to the set
of clause features).
Let cj be any clause of φ(X), and consider feature Dj . Because γ0[Dj ] = dj and γr[Dj ] = dj , there is
an index q < r such that γq[Dj ] = dj , γq+1[Dj ] = dj , and γq →Dj γq+1. Since flipping Dj has to be an
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improving flip, it must be the case that there is a literal feature Pj,k such that γq[Pj,k] = pj,k. Therefore,
since γ0[Pj,k] = pj,k and γq[Pj,k] = pj,k, there is an index p < q such that γp[Pj,k] = pj,k, γp+1[Pj,k] = pj,k,
and γp →Pj,k γp+1. By the definition of the CP table of Pj,k, it must also be the case that p < s. This
means that, for all the literal features that in ρ change their value from non-overlined to overlined, their
flipping happens before the s-th step. Hence, if two different literal features linked to the same variable
features V Ti and V Fi flip before the s-th step, then their flipping is based on consistent values assigned to
V Ti and V Fi .
Now there are two cases: either (a) `j,k = xi, or (b) `j,k = ¬xi. For (a), since flipping Pj,k has to be an
improving flip, it must be the case that γp[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi , therefore σ′X [xi] = true, and hence σ′X satisfies
cj . For (b), again since flipping Pj,k has to be an improving flip, it must be the case that γp[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi ,
therefore σ′X [xi] = false, and hence σ′X satisfies cj .
Therefore, if β Fs(φ) ασX , then there is an extension σ′X of σX to X satisfying φ(X).
We now prove (2). We know that β ./Fs(φ) ασX if and only if ασX 6Fs(φ) β and β 6Fs(φ) ασX . First, observe
that ασX 6Fs(φ) β is always true, because there is no improving flipping sequence from β to ασX , as the value
u1 of feature U1 in β cannot be flipped in Fs(φ), because it is the most preferred value of U1, and U1 does not
have parents. So, β ./Fs(φ) ασX if and only if β 6Fs(φ) ασX . Hence, showing that there is no extension of σX to
X satisfying φ(X) if and only if β ./Fs(φ) ασX is equivalent to showing that there is no extension of σX to X
satisfying φ(X) if and only if β 6Fs(φ) ασX . However, we have already shown this in (1).
Lemma 5.11. Let Φ = (∃X)(∀Y )¬φ(X,Y ) be a quantified Boolean formula, where φ(X,Y ) is a 3CNF Boolean
formula, defined over two disjoint sets X and Y of Boolean variables. Then, Φ is valid if and only ifMeml(Φ)
has a majority optimal outcome.
Proof. The intuition at the base of the proof is to put in relationship truth assignments over the variable set X
with outcomes ofMeml(Φ). In particular, given an assignment σX over X, the associated outcome is βσX , where
σX is encoded over the feature set V in the usual way, and all other features have non-overlined values. We
show first that outcomes not in the form of a βσX are not Majority optimal. Then, we show that if there is an
assignment σX such that (∀Y )¬φ(X/σX , Y ) is valid, then βσX is Majority optimal. On the other hand, if there
is no assignment σX for which (∀Y )¬φ(X/σX , Y ) is valid, then none of the outcomes βσX is Majority optimal.
To prove the statement of the lemma, we have to analyze the majority dominance relationships between
outcome pairs. To organize this task, we define the following sets of outcomes:
• Od = Od′ ∪Od′′ ∪Od′′′, where
– Od′ = {β ∈ OMeml(Φ) | (∃F )(F ∈ (V ′ ∪W ∪ P ∪ D ∪A ∪ B) ∧ β[F ] = f)};
– Od′′ = {β ∈ OMeml(Φ) | β[U1U2] 6= u1u2};
– Od′′′ = {β ∈ OMeml(Φ) | (∃i)(β[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi )}.
• Oc = {β ∈ OMeml(Φ) | β /∈ Od}.
Clearly, Od and Oc constitute a partition of OMeml(Φ). On the contrary, Od′, Od′′, and Od′′′, do not constitute
a partition of Od, because they are not disjoint. We show that only outcomes of a subset S (whose detailed
characterization will be given toward the end of the proof) of Oc might be Majority optimal. We do so by
showing that (1) all outcomes in (Od ∪Oc) \ S are majority dominated by some other outcome, and hence they
are not Majority optimal; and that (2) all outcomes in S, which might be empty, are not majority dominated,
and hence they are Majority optimal. Therefore,Meml(Φ) has a majority optimal outcome if and only if S is
non-empty.
We recall that, sinceMeml(Φ) is a 6CP-net, if α and β are two outcomes, |SMeml(Φ)(β, α)| ≥ 4 implies that
β majMeml(Φ) α.
Property 5.11.(1). Let β′ ∈ Od′ be an outcome. Then, β′ is not Majority optimal inMeml(Φ).
Proof. There are two cases: either (1) β′[U1U2] 6= u1u2, or (2) β′[U1U2] = u1u2:
(1) Let γ be the outcome assigning non-overlined values to all features in (V ∪ V ′ ∪W ∪ P ∪ D ∪ A ∪ B),
and such that γ[U1U2] = β′[U1U2]. We prove that γ majMeml(Φ) β′. Consider net N eml3 . The following is an
improving flipping sequence from β′ to γ, showing that γ Neml3 β′. We flip to their non-overlined value,
in the following order, all features in V, V ′, W, P, D, and A, having an overlined value in β′. Next, we
flip in the proper order all features in B having an overlined value in β′ to their non-overlined value. The
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outcome obtained is precisely γ. Moreover, since N eml4 = N eml3 , γ Neml4 β′, as well. Now, observe that by
the definition of N eml5 , γ Neml5 β′. We have seen that there are three agents preferring γ to β′.
Now there are two cases: either (a) β′[U1] = u1, or (b) β′[U1] = u1:
(a) Let us focus on N eml1 . The following is an improving flipping sequence from β′ to γ in N eml1 , showing
that γ Neml1 β′. Since β′[U1] = u1, we can flip to their non-overlined value all features in V and W having
an overlined value in β′. Next, we flip to their non-overlined value all features in P, D, A (in the proper
order), V ′, and B, having an overlined value in β′. The outcome reached is exactly γ. Therefore, in (1)(a),
there are four agents preferring γ to β′, and hence γ majMeml(Φ) β′.
(b) As we are in (1)(b), β′[U1] = u1 and β′[U1U2] 6= u1u2, hence β′[U1U2] = u1u2. Let us focus on N eml2 .
The improving flipping sequence from β′ to γ in N eml1 in (1)(a) is also an improving flipping sequence from
β′ to γ in N eml2 (because β′[U2] = u2). Therefore, in (1)(b), there are four agents preferring γ to β′, and
hence γ majMeml(Φ) β′.
(2) Let γ′ be the outcome assigning an overlined value only to U1. We prove that γ′ majMeml(Φ) β′. Consider
net N eml1 . By the definition of the net, we can flip U1 from u1 to u1. Once this is done, by performing
the improving flipping sequence from β′ to γ in N eml1 exhibited in (1)(a), we reach γ′ in this case. Hence,
γ′ Neml1 β′. Consider now net N eml3 . Since β′ ∈ Od
′, there is a feature F ∈ (V ′ ∪ W ∪ P ∪ D ∪ A ∪ B)
such that β′[F ] = f . By the definition of the disjunctive interconnecting net embedded in N eml3 , there is an
improving flipping sequence from β′ to an outcome in which U1 has an overlined value (we flip the features
in the interconnecting net until we flip its apex, and then we flip U1 to its overlined value). At this point,
by performing the improving flipping sequence from β′ to γ in N eml3 shown in (1) we reach γ′ in this case.
Hence, γ′ Neml3 β′. Since N eml4 = N eml3 , γ′ Neml4 β′, as well. Finally, by the definition of N eml5 , γ′ Neml5 β′.
Therefore, γ′ majMeml(Φ) β′, and hence β′ is not Majority optimal.
Property 5.11.(2). Let β′′ ∈ Od′′ be an outcome. Then, β′′ is not Majority optimal inMeml(Φ).
Proof. By Property 5.11.(1) we can focus on those outcomes β′′ assigning non-overlined values to all features
in V ′ ∪ W ∪ P ∪ D ∪ A ∪ B. There are three cases: (1) β′[U1U2] = u1u2, (2) β′[U1U2] = u1u2, or (3)
β′[U1U2] = u1u2:
(1) Let γ be the outcome such that, for all features F /∈ {U1, U2}, γ[F ] = β′′[F ], and γ[U1U2] = u1u2 6=
β′′[U1U2]. By the definition of N eml2 , N eml3 , N eml4 , and N eml5 , γ Neml2 β′′, γ Neml3 β′′, γ Neml4 β′′, γ Neml5 β′′,
respectively. Therefore, γ majMeml(Φ) β′′, and β′′ is not Majority optimal.
(2) Let γ be the outcome such that, for all features F /∈ {U1, U2}, γ[F ] = β′′[F ], and γ[U1U2] = u1u2 6=
β′′[U1U2]. We show that γ majMeml(Φ) β′′. Consider net N eml1 . Since we are assuming that all features in A
have non-overlined value in β′′, we can flip U2 from u2 to u2. Hence, γ Neml1 β′′. By the definition of N eml3 ,
N eml4 , and N eml5 , γ Neml3 β′′, γ Neml4 β′′, γ Neml5 β′′, respectively. Therefore, γ 
maj
Meml(Φ) β
′′, and β′′ is not
Majority optimal.
(3) Let γ be the outcome such that, for all features F /∈ {U1, U2}, γ[F ] = β′′[F ], and γ[U1U2] = u1u2 6=
β′′[U1U2]. We show that γ majMeml(Φ) β′′. Consider net N eml2 . Since we are assuming that all features in A
have non-overlined value in β′′, we can flip U1 from u1 to u1. Hence, γ Neml2 β′′. Moreover, we are assuming
also that all features in B have non-overlined value in β′′, which implies that in N eml3 we can flip U1 from u1
to u1. Therefore, γ Neml3 β′′. Since N eml3 = N eml4 , γ Neml4 β′′, as well. Finally, by the definition of N eml6 ,
γ Neml6 β′′ (as we are assuming β′′[U2] = u2). Thus, γ 
maj
Meml(Φ) β
′′, and β′′ is not Majority optimal.
Property 5.11.(3). Let β′′′ ∈ Od′′′ be an outcome. Then, β′′′ is not Majority optimal inMeml(Φ).
Proof. By Properties 5.11.(1) and 5.11.(2), we can focus on those outcomes β′′′ assigning non-overlined values
to all features in V ′ ∪ W ∪ P ∪ D ∪ A ∪ B, and such that β′′′[U1U2] = u1u2. Since β′′′ ∈ Od′′′, there is a
pair of features (V Ti , V Fi ) such that β′′′[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi . Let γ be the outcome such that, for all features
F /∈ {V Ti , V Fi , U1, U2}, γ[F ] = β′′′[F ], γ[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi 6= β′′′[V Ti V Fi ], and γ[U1U2] = u1u2 6= β′′′[U1U2].
We show that γ majMeml(Φ) β′′′.
Consider net N eml1 . We can flip feature U1 from u1 to u1. Then, we can flip features V Ti and V Fi to their
non-overlined value. The reached outcome is precisely γ, and hence γ Neml1 β′′′.
Consider now net N eml3 . Since β′′′[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi , we can flip V ′i from v′i to v′i. Then, we flip V Ti and V Fi
to their non-overlined value. At this point, since β′′′[U1U2] = u1u2, the improving flipping sequence in N eml3
exhibited in Case (2) of Property 5.11.(1), in which the flips of features in V are ignored, is an improving
flipping sequence from β′′′ to γ in this case. Hence, γ Neml3 β′′′. Since N eml3 = N eml4 , γ Neml4 β′′′, as well.
Finally, by the definition of N eml5 , γ Neml5 β′′′. Therefore, γ 
maj
Meml(Φ) β
′′′.
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The three properties above show that any outcome β ∈ Od is not Majority optimal. Consider now outcomes
in Oc. Observe that, since Od and Oc are disjoint, all outcomes βc ∈ Oc are characterized by having all
features in V ′ ∪W ∪ P ∪ D ∪A ∪ B with non-overlined values, βc[U1U2] = u1u2, and, for all variables xi ∈ X,
βc[V Ti V Fi ] 6= vTi vFi .
Given an assignment σX for the variables in X, we define βσX ∈ Oc as the outcome encoding σX over the
feature set V as usual. Denote byWitnc the set of all complete assignments σX overX such that (∀Y )¬φ(X/σX , Y )
is not valid (i.e., such that φ(X/σX , Y ) is satisfiable). Let Witn be the set of all (partial or complete) assignments
σX over X such that there is an extension of σX to X belonging to Witnc, and let Witn be the set of all (partial
or complete) assignments over X not belonging to Witn. Recall that if σX is a complete assignment over X, then
σX itself is the unique extension of σX to X. Given the above definitions, OWitnc = {βσX ∈ Oc | σX ∈Witn}
and OWitnc = {βσX ∈ Oc | σX ∈Witn} constitute a partition of Oc. This implies that, if β ∈ Oc is an outcome,
then there is a (partial or complete) assignment σX over the variables in X such that β = βσX .
We show that all outcomes in OWitnc are not Majority optimal, and that all outcomes in OWitnc are majority
optimal (i.e., OWitnc is the set S mentioned earlier).
Property 5.11.(4). Let βc ∈ OWitnc be an outcome. Then, βc is not Majority optimal inMeml(Φ).
Proof. Let α be the outcome assigning overlined values only to U1 and U2. We show that α majMeml(Φ) βc.
Let σX ∈Witn be the (partial or complete) assignment over X such that βc = βσX .
Consider the net N eml1 . First, note that, for any outcome βc ∈ Oc, βc assigns non-overlined values to all
features in V ′ ∪ B. Therefore, the part of net N eml1 over feature sets V ′ and B does not play an active role in
any improving flipping sequence (if exists) either from α to βc, or from βc to α, because in N eml1 , features in
V ′ ∪ B have no parents, and they have already their most preferred values in α and βc.
Consider now the non-quantified formula φ(X,Y ). If we consider the set X∪Y of all the Boolean variables
in φ, the assignment σX is a partial assignment over X ∪ Y . Since σX ∈ Witn, there is an extension σ′X
of σX to X such that (∀Y )¬φ(X/σ′X , Y ) is not valid (i.e., φ(X/σ′X , Y ) is satisfiable), and hence there is an
extension of σX to X ∪ Y satisfying φ. Therefore, by Lemma 5.2, α Neml1 βc. Observe that the differences
between N eml1 and N eml2 are only in the roles of features U1 and U2, which are exchanged. Hence, by (an
adaptation of) Lemma 5.2, α Neml2 βc, as well.
Consider now N eml5 . The following is an improving flipping sequence from βc to α. We flip U1 from u1
to u1, and then U2 from u2 to u2. After this, we flip to their non-overlined value all features in V having
overlined values in βc. The outcome reached is precisely α, and hence α Neml5 βc.
Finally, consider net N eml6 . The following is an improving flipping sequence from βc to α. We flip U1
from u1 to u1 (remember that βc[U2] = u2). Next, we flip U2 from u2 to u2. To conclude, we flip to their
non-overlined value all features in V having overlined values in βc. The outcome reached is precisely α, and
hence α Neml6 βc. Therefore, α 
maj
Meml(Φ) βc, and βc is not Majority optimal.
The goal of the next properties is to show that outcomes in OWitnc are Majority optimal. We prove this by
showing that any outcome βc ∈ OWitnc is not majority dominated by any other outcome. Note that, since
Meml(Φ) is a 6CP-net, for any two outcomes α and β, if |SMeml(Φ)(β, α)| ≤ 3, then β 6
maj
Meml(Φ) α.
Property 5.11.(5). Let βc ∈ OWitnc and γ be two outcomes such that there is a feature F ∈ (W ∪P ∪ D ∪A)
for which γ[F ] 6= βc[F ]. Then, γ 6majMeml(Φ) βc.
Proof. Since γ[F ] 6= βc[F ], and βc[F ] = f because βc ∈ OWitnc ⊆ Oc, it must be the case that γ[F ] = f .
Therefore, by the definition of N eml3 , N eml4 , and N eml5 , γ 6Neml3 βc, γ 6Neml4 βc, and γ 6Neml5 βc. Thus,
|SMeml(Φ)(γ, βc)| ≤ 3, and hence γ 6
maj
Meml(Φ) βc.
Property 5.11.(6). Let βc ∈ OWitnc and γ be two outcomes such that there is a feature F ∈ (V ′ ∪ B) for which
γ[F ] 6= βc[F ]. Then, γ 6majMeml(Φ) βc.
Proof. Since γ[F ] 6= βc[F ], and βc[F ] = f because βc ∈ OWitnc ⊆ Oc, it must be the case that γ[F ] = f .
Therefore, by the definition of N eml1 , N eml2 , and N eml5 , γ 6Neml1 βc, γ 6Neml2 βc, and γ 6Neml5 βc. Thus,
|SMeml(Φ)(γ, βc)| ≤ 3, and hence γ 6
maj
Meml(Φ) βc.
Property 5.11.(7). Let βc ∈ OWitnc and γ be two outcomes such that γ[U1U2] 6= βc[U1U2] = u1u2. Then,
γ 6majMeml(Φ) βc.
Proof. Consider first net N eml3 . Since βc ∈ OWitnc ⊆ Oc, all features in V ′ ∪ W ∪ P ∪ D ∪ A ∪ B have a
non-overlined value in βc, and there is no pair of features (V Ti , V Fi ) such that βc[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi . Hence, the
disjunctive interconnecting net embedded in N eml3 cannot be exploited in any improving flipping sequence
that aims at reaching an outcome in which U1 or U2 has an overlined value. Hence, for any outcome γ such
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that γ[U1] = u1 or γ[U2] = u2, γ 6Neml3 βc. By N eml3 = N eml4 , for any outcome γ such that γ[U1] = u1 or
γ[U2] = u2, γ 6Neml4 βc, as well.
Since γ[U1U2] 6= βc[U1U2] = u1u2, there are the three cases (1) γ[U1U2] = u1u2, (2) γ[U1U2] = u1u2, or
(3) γ[U1U2] = u1u2:
(1) Let us focus on N eml1 . First note that, for any outcome βc ∈ Oc, βc assigns non-overlined values to all
features in V ′ ∪ B, and by Property 5.11.(7) we can assume that γ assigns non-overlined values to features
in V ′ ∪ B. Therefore, the part of net N eml1 over feature sets V ′ and B does not play an active role in any
improving flipping sequence (if exists) either from γ to βc, or from βc to γ because, in N eml1 , features in
V ′ ∪ B have no parents, and they have already their most preferred values in βc and γ.
Let σX ∈Witn be the (partial or complete) assignment over X such that βc = βσX . Since σX ∈Witn,
there is no extension σ′X of σX to X such that (∀Y )¬φ(X/σ′X , Y ) is not valid, (i.e., such that φ(X/σ′X , Y ) is
satisfiable). Consider the non-quantified formula φ(X,Y ). If we consider the set X ∪ Y of all the Boolean
variables in φ, the assignment σX is a partial assignment over X ∪ Y . Since φ(X/σX , Y ) is not satisfiable,
there is no extension of σX to X ∪ Y satisfying φ. Therefore, by inspection of the proof of Lemma 5.2, in
N eml1 there is no improving flipping sequence from βc to an outcome in which U2 has an overlined value,
hence γ 6Neml1 βc.
From this, and from what we have already shown for nets N eml3 and N eml4 , it follows that |SMeml(Φ)(γ, βc)| ≤
3, and hence γ 6majMeml(Φ) βc.
(2) If we focus on N eml2 , a similar argument to the one used in (1) for net N eml1 shows that γ 6Neml2 βc (simply
observe that the roles on U1 and U2 are exchanged). Again, from this, and from what we have already shown
for nets N eml3 and N eml4 , it follows that |SMeml(Φ)(γ, βc)| ≤ 3, and hence γ 6
maj
Meml(Φ) βc.
(3) By combining the discussions in (1) and (2), it is possible to show that γ 6Neml1 βc and γ 6Neml2 βc (and
that γ 6Neml3 βc and γ 6Neml4 βc). Thus, |S

Meml(Φ)(γ, βc)| ≤ 2, and hence γ 6
maj
Meml(Φ) βc.
Property 5.11.(8). Let βc ∈ OWitnc and γ be two outcomes such that there is a feature F ∈ V for which
γ[F ] 6= βc[F ]. Then, γ 6majMeml(Φ) βc.
Proof. Let Change = {F ∈ V | βc[F ] 6= γ[F ]} be the set of all variable features in V changing value from βc
to γ. Let Up = {F ∈ V | βc[F ] = f ∧ γ[F ] = f} be the subset of Change containing the variable features in V
changing their value from non-overlined in βc to overlined in γ. Let Down = {F ∈ V | βc[F ] = f ∧ γ[F ] = f}
be the subset of Change containing the variable features in V changing their value from overlined in βc to
non-overlined in γ. Clearly, Up and Down constitute a partition of Change, and, since from the statement of
this property, we assume that Change 6= ∅, it must be the case that (Up ∪Down) 6= ∅. There are the two
cases (1) Up 6= ∅, or (2) Up = ∅:
(1) Since there are variable features in V changing their value from non-overlined in βc to overlined in γ, by the
definition of N eml3 , N eml4 , and N eml5 , γ 6Neml3 βc, γ 6Neml4 βc, and γ 6Neml5 βc. Therefore, |S

Meml(Φ)(γ, βc)| ≤ 3,
and hence γ 6majMeml(Φ) βc.
(2) Since Up = ∅ and Change 6= ∅, it must be the case that Down 6= ∅, and hence there are variable features
in V changing their value from overlined in βc to non-overlined in γ. Moreover, by Property 5.11.(7), we can
assume that γ[U1U2] = u1u2. Consider net N eml1 . Observe that feature U1 in N eml1 has no parents. Hence,
once U1 is flipped from u1 to u1, it cannot be flipped back. Therefore, since βc[U1] = γ[U1] = u1, in any
improving flipping sequence in N eml1 from βc to γ (if exists), feature U1 cannot be flipped at all. However,
by the definition of the CP tables in N eml1 , when U1 has value u1, variable features can be flipped only
from non-overlined to overlined. Hence, from Down 6= ∅ it follows that γ 6Neml1 βc. A similar argument
(but focused on U2) shows that γ 6Neml2 βc and γ 6Neml6 βc. Therefore, |S

Meml(Φ)(γ, βc)| ≤ 3, and hence
γ 6majMeml(Φ) βc.
We are now ready to prove that Φ = (∃X)(∀Y )¬φ(X,Y ) is valid if and only ifMeml(Φ) has a majority optimal
outcome.
(⇒) Assume that Φ is valid, hence there is an assignment σX for the variables in X such that σX ∈ Witn.
By Properties 5.11.(5), 5.11.(6), 5.11.(7), and 5.11.(8), βσX is Majority optimal inMeml(Φ), and hence
Meml(Φ) has a majority optimal outcome.
(⇐) Assume that Φ is not valid, hence there is no assignment in Witn, and so OWitnc is empty. By Proper-
ties 5.11.(1), 5.11.(2), 5.11.(3), and 5.11.(4), all outcomes in Od ∪OWitnc are not Majority optimal, and,
since OWitnc is empty,Meml(Φ) does not have a majority optimal outcome.
37
Lemma 5.15. Let Φ = (∃X)(∀Y )¬φ(X,Y ) be a quantified Boolean formula, where φ(X,Y ) is a 3CNF Boolean
formula, defined over two disjoint sets X and Y of Boolean variables. Then, Φ is valid if and only ifMimm(Φ)
does not have a majority optimum outcome. In particular, whenMimm(Φ) has a majority optimum outcome it
is the outcome α ∈ OMimm(Φ) assigning overlined values only to features U1 and U2.
Proof. The intuition at the base of the proof is to put in relationship truth assignments over the variable set
X with outcomes ofMimm(Φ). In particular, given an assignment σX over X, the associated outcome is βσX ,
where σX is encoded over the feature set V in the usual way, and all other features have non-overlined values. We
show first that α majority dominates any other outcome β that is not in the form of a βσX outcome, and hence
none of them is Majority optimum. Moreover, for all such outcomes βσX , βσX does not majority dominates α,
and hence, again, none of them is Majority optimum. So, only α is candidate to be Majority optimum. Then, we
show that if there is an assignment σX such that (∀Y )¬φ(X/σX , Y ) is valid, then α 6majMimm(Φ) βσX , and hence
α is not Majority optimum, which implies thatMimm(Φ) does not have any majority optimum outcome. On the
other hand, if there is no assignment σX for which (∀Y )¬φ(X/σX , Y ) is valid, then, for all the outcomes βσX ,
α majMimm(Φ) βσX , which implies that α is majority optimum.
To prove the statement of the lemma we have to analyze the majority dominance relationship between α and
the other outcomes. To organize this task, let us define the following sets of outcomes:
• Od = Od′ ∪Od′′ ∪Od′′′, where
– Od′ = {β ∈ OMimm(Φ) | (∃F )(F ∈ (V ′ ∪W ∪ P ∪ D ∪A ∪ B) ∧ β[F ] = f)};
– Od′′ = {β ∈ OMimm(Φ) | β[U1U2] 6= u1u2};
– Od′′′ = {β ∈ OMimm(Φ) | (∃i)(β[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi )}.
• Oc = {β ∈ OMimm(Φ) | β /∈ Od}.
Clearly, Od and Oc constitute a partition of OMimm(Φ). On the contrary, Od′, Od′′, and Od′′′, do not constitute
a partition of Od because they are not disjoint. Note that α ∈ Od′′. We show that α is the only outcome that
might be Majority optimum. We do so by showing that (1) all outcomes different from α in Od ∪ Oc, but a
specific subset S (whose detailed characterization will be given toward the end of the proof) of outcomes of Oc,
are majority dominated by α, which means that all outcomes in (Od ∪Oc) \ ({α} ∪ S) are Majority optimum;
and that (2) all outcomes in S, which might be empty, neither majority dominate, nor are majority dominated
by, α, and hence they are not Majority optimum. Therefore, α is Majority optimum if and only if S is empty.
Note that, by the definition of N imm2 , α N imm2 β for any outcome β 6= α, and hence, sinceMimm(Φ) is a
3CP-net, if α N imm1 β or α N imm3 β, then α 
maj
Mimm(Φ) β.
Property 5.15.(1). Let β′ ∈ Od′ be an outcome. Then, α majMimm(Φ) β′.
Proof. Since β′ ∈ Od′, let F ∈ (V ′ ∪W ∪P ∪D∪A∪B) be a feature such that β′[F ] = f . Because α[F ] = f ,
β′ 6= α, and hence α N imm2 β′. Consider net N imm3 . The following is an improving flipping sequence from β′
to α in N imm3 , showing that α N imm3 β′, and hence that α 
maj
Mimm(Φ) β
′. Since β′[F ] = f , by the definition
of the disjunctive interconnecting net embedded in N imm3 , we can flip in the proper order some features of
the interconnecting net to their overlined values, until we flip its apex B. Once the apex has an overlined
value, we flip to their overlined value U1 and then U2 (if they do not have an overlined value already). After
this, we flip to their non-overlined values all features in V ∪W ∪ P ∪ D ∪ A having overlined values in β′.
Next, we flip to their non-overlined values all features in V ′ having overlined values, and subsequently those
in B having overlined values.
Property 5.15.(2). Let β′′ ∈ Od′′ be an outcome different from α. Then, α majMimm(φ) β′′.
Proof. Since we are assuming β′′ 6= α, it holds that α N imm2 β′′. There are the three cases (1) β′′[U1U2] =
u1u2, or (2) β′′[U1U2] = u1u2, or (3) β′′[U1U2] = u1u2:
(1) Let us focus on net N imm3 . The following is an improving flipping sequence from β′′ to α in N imm3 ,
showing that α N imm3 β′′, and hence that α 
maj
Mimm(Φ) β
′′. We can flip all features, but U1 and U2, to their
non-overlined values in a proper sequence which could be V, V ′, W, P, D, A, and B.
(2) Let us focus again on net N imm3 . The following is an improving flipping sequence from β′′ to α in N imm3 ,
showing that α N imm3 β′′, and hence that α 
maj
Mimm(Φ) β
′′. Since β′′[U1U2] = u1u2, we can flip U2 from u2 to
u2. Now we are again in the case in which β′′[U1U2] = u1u2. Hence, there is an improving flipping sequence
to α as shown in (1).
(3) Let us consider net N imm1 . The following is an improving flipping sequence from β′′ to α in N imm1 , showing
that α N imm1 β′′, and hence that α 
maj
Mimm(Φ) β
′′. We can flip U1 from u1 to u1. Then, in the order V, W,
P, D, A, V ′, and B, we flip features having overlined values to their non-overlined values.
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Property 5.15.(3). Let β′′′ ∈ Od′′′ be an outcome. Then, α majMimm(Φ) β′′′.
Proof. Since β′′′ ∈ Od′′′′, there is a pair of features (V Ti , V Fi ) such that β′′′[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi . Because
α[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi , β′′′ 6= α, and hence α N imm2 β′′′. Consider net N imm3 . We show that there is an improving
flipping sequence from β′′′ to α in N imm3 , proving that α N imm3 β′′′, and hence that α 
maj
Mimm(Φ) β
′′′.
Since β′′′[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi , if β′′′[V ′i ] = v′i, we can flip the value of V ′i from v′i to v′i. This bring us in
the case in which there is a feature F in V ′ with overlined value. We have already shown in the proof of
Property 5.15.(1) that in N imm3 there exists an improving flipping sequence from this outcome to α.
The three properties above show that any outcome β ∈ Od that is different from α is majority dominated by α.
This proves that any such outcome β is not Majority optimum, and that α majority dominates all of them.
Let us now consider outcomes in Oc. Observe that, since Od and Oc are disjoint, all outcomes βc ∈ Oc are
characterized by having all features in V ′ ∪W ∪P ∪D ∪A∪B with non-overlined values, βc[U1U2] = u1u2, and,
for all variables xi ∈ X, βc[V Ti V Fi ] 6= vTi vFi .
Given an assignment σX for the variables in X, we define βσX ∈ Oc as the outcome encoding σX over
the feature set V as usual. Let us denote by Witnc the set of all complete assignments σX over X such that
(∀Y )¬φ(X/σX , Y ) is not valid (i.e., such that φ(X/σX , Y ) is satisfiable). Let Witn be the set of all (partial or
complete) assignments σX over X such that there is an extension of σX to X belonging to Witnc, and let Witn
be the set of all (partial or complete) assignments over X not belonging to Witn. Remember that if σX is a
complete assignment over X, then σX itself is the unique extension of σX to X. Given the above definitions,
OWitnc = {βσX ∈ Oc | σX ∈ Witn}, and OWitnc = {βσX ∈ Oc | σX ∈ Witn} constitute a partition of Oc. This
implies that, if β ∈ Oc is an outcome, then there is a (partial or complete) assignment σX over the variables in
X such that β = βσX .
We show that all outcomes in OWitnc are majority dominated by α, and that all outcomes in OWitnc are not
majority dominated by α and do not majority dominate α (i.e., OWitnc is the set S mentioned earlier).
For the following two properties it is useful to note that, for any outcome βc ∈ Oc, βc assigns non-overlined
values to all features in V ′ ∪ B, and also α assigns non-overlined values to features in V ′ ∪ B. Therefore, the part
of net N imm1 over feature sets V ′ and B does not play an active role in any improving flipping sequence (if exists)
either from α to βc, or from βc to α because, in N imm1 , features in V ′ ∪B have no parents, and they have already
their most preferred values in α and βc.
Property 5.15.(4). Let βc ∈ OWitnc be an outcome. Then, α majMimm(Φ) βc.
Proof. Let σX ∈Witn be the (partial or complete) assignment over X such that βc = βσX .
Let us focus on net N imm1 . Consider now the non-quantified formula φ(X,Y ). If we consider the set X ∪Y
of all the Boolean variables in φ, the assignment σX is a partial assignment over X ∪ Y . Since σX ∈Witn,
there is an extension σ′X of σX to X such that (∀Y )¬φ(X/σ′X , Y ) is not valid (i.e., such that φ(X/σ′X , Y )
is satisfiable), and hence there is an extension of σX to X ∪ Y satisfying φ. Therefore, by Lemma 5.2,
α N imm1 βc. Since α ∈ Od
′′ and βc ∈ Oc, βc 6= α, and hence α N imm2 βc. Thus, α 
maj
Mimm(Φ) βc.
Property 5.15.(5). Let βc ∈ OWitnc be an outcome. Then, α 6majMimm(Φ) βc and βc 6
maj
Mimm(Φ) α.
Proof. Let σX ∈Witn be the (partial or complete) assignment over X such that βc = βσX . Since σX ∈Witn,
there is no extension σ′X of σX to X such that (∀Y )¬φ(X/σ′X , Y ) is not valid, (i.e., such that φ(X/σ′X , Y ) is
satisfiable).
Now consider net N imm1 . We claim that βc ./N imm1 α. Consider the non-quantified formula φ(X,Y ). If
we consider the set X ∪ Y of all the Boolean variables in φ, the assignment σX is a partial assignment over
X ∪ Y . Since φ(X/σX , Y ) is not satisfiable, there is no extension of σX to X ∪ Y satisfying φ. Therefore, by
Lemma 5.2, βc ./N imm1 α.
Now, since α ∈ Od′′ and βc ∈ Oc, βc 6= α, and hence α N imm2 βc. To conclude, let us now focus on net
N imm3 . By βc ∈ Oc, all features in B have non-overlined values, βc[U1U2] = u1u2, and there is no pair of
features (V Ti , V Fi ) such that βc[V Ti V Fi ] = vTi vFi . Since in N imm3 feature U1 is attached to the apex B of the
interconnecting net, and U1 can be flipped from u1 to u1 only when the apex B of the interconnecting net
has an overlined value, there is no improving flipping sequence from βc to α, and hence α 6N imm3 βc.
To summarize, we showed that βc ./N imm1 α, α N imm2 βc, and α 6N imm3 βc. Therefore, α 6
maj
Mimm(Φ) βc,
because |SMimm(Φ)(α, βc)| < 2, and βc 6
maj
Mimm(Φ) α, because |SMimm(Φ)(βc, α)| < 2.
We are now ready to prove that Φ = (∃X)(∀Y )¬φ(X,Y ) is valid if and only if α is not majority optimum in
Mimm(Φ).
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(⇒) Assume that Φ is valid. By Properties 5.15.(1), 5.15.(2), 5.15.(3), and 5.15.(4), all outcomes in Od ∪OWitnc
different from α are not Majority optimum. Moreover, from Property 5.15.(5), all outcomes in OWitnc
are not majority optimum, and α does not majority dominate outcomes in OWitnc . Hence, also α is not
Majority optimum. Therefore, inMimm(Φ) there is no majority optimum outcome.
(⇐) Assume that Φ is not valid, hence there is no assignment in Witn, and so OWitnc is empty. By Proper-
ties 5.15.(1), 5.15.(2), 5.15.(3), and 5.15.(4), all outcomes in Od ∪ OWitnc different from α are majority
dominated by α. Since OWitnc is empty, α majority dominates all other outcomes, which implies that in
Mimm(Φ) there is a majority optimum outcome, which is α.
References
[1] S. Airiau, U. Endriss, U. Grandi, D. Porello, and J. Uckelman. Aggregating dependency graphs into voting
agendas in multi-issue elections. In T. Walsh, editor, Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2011), pages 18–23, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, July 16–22 2011. URL
http://ijcai.org/Proceedings/11/Papers/015.pdf.
[2] K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, and K. Suzumura, editors. Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 1,
volume 19 of Handbooks in Economics. North Holland/Elsevier, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2002.
[3] K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, and K. Suzumura, editors. Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 2,
volume 19 of Handbooks in Economics. North Holland/Elsevier, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2011.
[4] D. Baumeister and J. Rothe. Preference aggregation by voting. In J. Rothe, editor, Economics and
Computation, chapter 4, pages 197–326. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg, Germany, 2016.
[5] J. C. Boerkoel Jr., E. H. Durfee, and K. Purrington. Generalized solution techniques for preference-
based constrained optimization with CP-nets. In W. van der Hoek, G. A. Kaminka, Y. Lespérance,
M. Luck, and S. Sen, editors, Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010), pages 291–298, Toronto, ON, Canada, May 10–14 2010. URL
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=1838206.1838247.
[6] S. Borgwardt, B. Fazzinga, T. Lukasiewicz, A. Shrivastava, and O. Tifrea-Marciuska. Preferential query
answering over the Semantic Web with possibilistic networks. In S. Kambhampati, editor, Proceedings of
the 25th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2016), pages 994–1000, New York,
NY, USA, July 9–15 2016. URL http://www.ijcai.org/Abstract/16/145.
[7] C. Boutilier, R. I. Brafman, H. H. Hoos, and D. Poole. Reasoning with conditional ceteris paribus preference
statements. In K. B. Laskey and H. Prade, editors, Proceedings of the 15th Conference on Uncertainty
in Artificial Intelligence (UAI ‘99), pages 71–80, Stockholm, Sweden, July 30–August 1 1999. URL
www.cs.toronto.edu/kr/papers/CPnets.pdf.
[8] C. Boutilier, R. I. Brafman, C. Domshlak, H. H. Hoos, and D. Poole. CP-nets: A tool for representing and
reasoning with conditional ceteris paribus preference statements. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research,
21:135–191, 2004. doi:10.1613/jair.1234.
[9] C. Boutilier, R. I. Brafman, C. Domshlak, H. H. Hoos, and D. Poole. Preference-based constrained optimiza-
tion with CP-nets. Computational Intelligence, 20(2):137–157, 2004. doi:10.1111/j.0824-7935.2004.00234.x.
[10] R. I. Brafman and Y. Chernyavsky. Planning with goal preferences and constraints. In S. Biundo,
K. L. Myers, and K. Rajan, editors, Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Automated
Planning and Scheduling (ICAPS 2005), pages 182–191, Monterey, CA, USA, June 5–10 2005. URL
https://www.aaai.org/Papers/ICAPS/2005/ICAPS05-019.pdf.
[11] R. I. Brafman and C. Domshlak. TCP-nets for preference-based product configuration. In M. Aldanondo,
editor, Proceedings of the ECAI 2002 Workshop on Configuration, pages 101–106, Lyon, France, July 22–23
2002. URL http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.131.227&rep=rep1&type=
pdf.
[12] R. I. Brafman and C. Domshlak. Preference handling — An introductory tutorial. AI Magazine, 30(1):
58–86, 2009. doi:10.1609/aimag.v30i1.2114.
40
[13] R. I. Brafman, C. Domshlak, Y. Engel, and M. Tennenholtz. Transferable utility planning games. In M. Fox
and D. Poole, editors, Proceedings of the 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2010),
pages 709–714, Atlanta, GA, USA, July 11-15 2010. URL https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/
AAAI10/paper/view/1627.
[14] R. I. Brafman, F. Rossi, D. Salvagnin, K. B. Venable, and T. Walsh. Finding the next solution in constraint-
and preference-based knowledge representation formalisms. In F. Lin, U. Sattler, and M. Truszczynski,
editors, Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on the Principles of Knowledge Representation
and Reasoning (KR 2010), pages 425–433, Toronto, ON, Canada, May 9–13 2010. URL http://aaai.org/
ocs/index.php/KR/KR2010/paper/view/1348.
[15] S. J. Brams, D. M. Kilgour, and W. S. Zwicker. The paradox of multiple elections. Social Choice and
Welfare, 15(2):211–236, 1998. doi:10.1007/s003550050101.
[16] F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, and U. Endriss. Computational social choice. In G. Weiss, editor, Multiagent
Systems, pages 213–283. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2013.
[17] F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia, editors. Handbook of Computational
Social Choice. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA, 2016.
[18] Y. Chevaleyre, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and N. Maudet. Preference handling in combinatorial domains: From
AI to social choice. AI Magazine, 29(4):37–46, 2008. doi:10.1609/aimag.v29i4.2201.
[19] V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm. Communication complexity of common voting rules. In M. J. Riedl,
John Kearns and M. K. Reiter, editors, Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC
2005), pages 78–87, Vancouver, BC, Canada, June 5–8 2005. URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?
doid=1064009.1064018.
[20] V. Conitzer and L. Xia. Paradoxes of multiple elections: An approximation approach. In G. Brewka,
T. Eiter, and S. A. McIlraith, editors, Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on the Principles of
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR 2012), pages 179–187, Rome, Italy, June 10–14 2012. URL
https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/KR/KR12/paper/view/4541/4889.
[21] V. Conitzer, J. Lang, and L. Xia. Hypercubewise preference aggregation in multi-issue domains. In T. Walsh,
editor, Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2011),
pages 158–163, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, July 16–22 2011. URL http://ijcai.org/Proceedings/11/
Papers/038.pdf.
[22] C. Cornelio, U. Grandi, J. Goldsmith, N. Mattei, F. Rossi, and K. B. Venable. Reasoning with PCP-nets in
a multi-agent context. In G. Weiss, P. Yolum, R. H. Bordini, and E. Elkind, editors, Proceedings of the 14th
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2015), pages 969–977,
Istanbul, Turkey, May 4–8 2015. URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2773276.
[23] T. Di Noia, T. Lukasiewicz, M. V. Martinez, G. I. Simari, and O. Tifrea-Marciuska. Combining existential
rules with the power of CP-theories. In Q. Yang and M. Wooldridge, editors, Proceedings of the 24th
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2015), pages 2918–2925, Buenos Aires,
Argentina, July 25–31 2015. URL http://ijcai.org/Abstract/15/413.
[24] A. Felfernig, L. Hotz, C. Bagley, and J. Tiihonen, editors. Knowledge-Based Configuration: From Research
to Business Cases. Morgan Kaufmann/Elsevier, Waltham, MA, USA, 2014.
[25] D. S. Felsenthal and N. Tideman. Weak condorcet winner(s) revisited. Public Choice, 160(3):313–326, 2014.
doi:10.1007/s11127-014-0180-4.
[26] M. R. Garey and D. S. Johnson. Computers and Intractability. A guide to the theory of NP-Completeness.
W. H. Freeman and Company, New York, NY, USA, 1979.
[27] J. Goldsmith, J. Lang, M. Truszczynski, and N. Wilson. The computational complexity of dominance and
consistency in CP-nets. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 33:403–432, 2008. doi:10.1613/jair.2627.
[28] G. Gottlob and E. Malizia. Achieving new upper bounds for the hypergraph duality problem through logic.
In T. A. Henzinger and D. Miller, editors, Proceedings of the Joint Meeting of the 23rd EACSL Annual
Conference on Computer Science Logic (CSL) and the 29th Annual ACM/IEEE Symposium on Logic in
Computer Science (LICS) (CSL-LICS 2014), pages 43:1–43:10, Vienna, Austria, July 14–18 2014. URL
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2603088.2603103.
41
[29] G. Gottlob and E. Malizia. Achieving new upper bounds for the hypergraph duality problem through logic.
SIAM Journal on Computing, 47(2):456–492, 2018. doi:10.1137/15M1027267.
[30] U. Grandi, H. Luo, N. Maudet, and F. Rossi. Aggregating CP-nets with unfeasible outcomes. In B. O’Sullivan,
editor, Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming - 20th International Conference, CP 2014, Lyon,
France, September 8–12, 2014. Proceedings, volume 8656 of LNCS, pages 366–381. Springer-Verlag, Berlin
Heidelberg, Germany, 2014. URL https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-10428-7_
28.
[31] G. Greco, E. Malizia, L. Palopoli, and F. Scarcello. On the complexity of compact coalitional games. In
C. Boutilier, editor, Proceedings of the 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI
2009), pages 147–152, Pasadena, CA, USA, July 11–17 2009. URL https://www.ijcai.org/Proceedings/
09/Papers/035.pdf.
[32] G. Greco, E. Malizia, L. Palopoli, and F. Scarcello. Constrained coalitional games: formal framework,
properties, and complexity results. In C. Sierra, C. Castelfranchi, K. S. Decker, and J. S. Sichman, editors,
Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS
2009), pages 1295–1296, Budapest, Hungary, May 10–15 2009. URL https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?
doid=1558109.1558260.
[33] G. Greco, E. Malizia, L. Palopoli, and F. Scarcello. Non-transferable utility coalitional games via mixed-
integer linear constraints. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 38:633–685, 2010. doi:10.1613/jair.3060.
[34] G. Greco, E. Malizia, L. Palopoli, and F. Scarcello. On the complexity of core, kernel, and bargaining set.
Artificial Intelligence, 175(12–13):1877–1910, 2011. doi:10.1016/j.artint.2011.06.002.
[35] G. Greco, E. Malizia, L. Palopoli, and F. Scarcello. On the complexity of the core over coalition structures.
In T. Walsh, editor, Proceedings of the 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(IJCAI 2011), pages 216–221, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, July 16–22 2011. URL http://ijcai.org/
Proceedings/11/Papers/047.pdf.
[36] G. Greco, E. Malizia, L. Palopoli, and F. Scarcello. The complexity of the nucleolus in compact games.
ACM Transactions on Computation Theory, 7(1):3:1–3:52, 2014. doi:10.1145/2692372.2692374.
[37] S. O. Hansson. What is ceteris paribus preference? Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25(3):307–332, 1996.
doi:10.1007/BF00248152.
[38] S. O. Hansson. Preference logic. In D. M. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, editors, Handbook of Philosophical
Logic, Volume 4, pages 319–393. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg, Germany, 2nd edition, 2002. URL http:
//link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-94-017-0456-4_4.
[39] S. Ieong and Y. Shoham. Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional
games. In J. Riedl, M. J. Kearns, and M. K. Reiter, editors, Proceedings 6th ACM Conference on
Electronic Commerce (EC 2005), pages 193–202, Vancouver, BC, Canada, June 5–8 2005. URL https:
//dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=1064009.1064030.
[40] D. S. Johnson. A catalog of complexity classes. In J. van Leeuwen, editor, Handbook of Theoretical Computer
Science (Vol. A), pages 67–161. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1990.
[41] R. M. Karp. Reducibility among combinatorial problems. In R. E. Miller, J. W. Thatcher, and J. D.
Bohlinger, editors, Complexity of Computer Computations. Proceedings of a symposium on the Complexity of
Computer Computations, held March 20–22, 1972, at the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown
Heights, New York, The IBM Research Symposia Series, pages 85–103. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg,
Germany, 1972. URL http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4684-2001-2_9.
[42] R. L. Keeney and H. Raiffa. Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs. Wiley
Series in Probability and Mathematical Statistics. John Wiley & Sons, New York, NY, USA, 1976.
[43] D. Lacy and E. M. S. Niou. A problem with referendums. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12(1):5–31, 2000.
doi:10.1177/0951692800012001001.
[44] J. Lang. From preference representation to combinatorial vote. In D. Fensel, F. Giunchiglia, D. L.
McGuinness, and M.-A. Williams, editors, Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Principles
and Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR 2002), pages 277–290, Toulouse, France, April 22–25
2002. URL http://www.lamsade.dauphine.fr/~lang/papers/l02.ps.
42
[45] J. Lang. Logical preference representation and combinatorial vote. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial
Intelligence, 42(1):37–71, 2004. doi:10.1023/B:AMAI.0000034522.25580.09.
[46] J. Lang. Vote and aggregation in combinatorial domains with structured preferences. In M. M. Veloso, editor,
Proceedings of the 20th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2007), pages 1366–
1371, Hyderabad, India, January 6–12 2007. URL http://ijcai.org/Proceedings/07/Papers/220.pdf.
[47] J. Lang and L. Xia. Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains. Mathematical Social
Sciences, 57(3):304–324, 2009. doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.12.010.
[48] J. Lang and L. Xia. Voting in combinatorial domains. In F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and
A. D. Procaccia, editors, Handbook of Computational Social Choice, pages 197–222. Cambridge University
Press, New York, NY, USA, 2016. URL http://www.lamsade.dauphine.fr/%7Elang/papers/LX16.pdf.
[49] M. Li, Q. B. Vo, and R. Kowalczyk. An effcient majority-rule-based approach for collective decision making
with CP-nets. In F. Lin, U. Sattler, and M. Truszczynski, editors, Proceedings of the 12th International
Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR 2010), pages 578–580, Toronto,
ON, Canada, May 9–13 2010. URL http://aaai.org/ocs/index.php/KR/KR2010/paper/view/1229.
[50] M. Li, Q. B. Vo, and R. Kowalczyk. An efficient procedure for collective decision-making with CP-
nets. In H. Coelho, R. Studer, and M. Wooldridge, editors, Proceedings of the 19th European Conference
on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2010), pages 375–380, Lisbon, Portugal, August 16–20 2010. URL
http://ebooks.iospress.nl/publication/5801.
[51] M. Li, Q. B. Vo, and R. Kowalczyk. Majority-rule-based preference aggregation on multi-attribute domains
with CP-nets. In L. Sonenberg, P. Stone, K. Tumer, and P. Yolum, editors, Proceedings of the 10th
International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011), pages 659–666,
Taipei, Taiwan, May 2–6 2011. URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2031711.
[52] M. Li, Q. B. Vo, and R. Kowalczyk. Aggregating multi-valued CP-nets: A CSP-based approach. Journal of
Heuristics, 21(1):107–140, 2015. doi:10.1007/s10732-014-9276-8.
[53] A. Loreggia, N. Mattei, F. Rossi, and K. B. Venable. A notion of distance between cp-nets. In M. Dastani
and G. Sukthankar, editors, Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2018), Stockholm, Sweden, July 10–13 2018. To appear.
[54] T. Lukasiewicz and E. Malizia. On the complexity of mCP-nets. In D. Schuurmans and M. Wellman, editors,
Proceedings of the 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2016), pages 558–564, Phoenix,
AZ, USA, February 12–17 2016. URL http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI16/paper/view/
12239.
[55] T. Lukasiewicz and E. Malizia. A novel characterization of the complexity class ΘPk based on counting and
comparison. Theoretical Computer Science, 694:21–33, 2017. doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2017.06.023.
[56] T. Lukasiewicz, M. V. Martinez, and G. I. Simari. Preference-based query answering in Datalog+/– ontologies.
In F. Rossi, editor, Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI
2013), pages 1017–1023, Beijing, China, August 3–9 2013. URL http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/
IJCAI/IJCAI13/paper/view/6505.
[57] T. Lukasiewicz, M. V. Martinez, G. I. Simari, and O. Tifrea-Marciuska. Ontology-based query answering with
group preferences. ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, 14(4):25:1–25:24, 2014. doi:10.1145/2677207.
[58] A. Maran, M. Nicolas, M. S. Pini, F. Rossi, and K. B. Venable. A framework for aggregating influenced
CP-nets and its resistance to bribery. In M. desJardins and M. L. Littman, editors, Proceedings of the 27th
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2013), pages 668–678, Bellevue, WA, USA, July 14–18
2013. URL https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI13/paper/viewFile/6383/7233.
[59] N. Mattei, M. S. Pini, F. Rossi, and K. B. Venable. Bribery in voting with CP-nets. Annals of Mathematics
and Artificial Intelligence, 68(1–3):135–160, 2013. doi:10.1007/s10472-013-9330-5.
[60] C. H. Papadimitriou. Computational Complexity. Addison Wesley, Reading, MA, USA, 1994.
[61] C. H. Papadimitriou and M. Yannakakis. The complexity of facets (and some facets of complexity). Journal
of Computer and System Sciences, 28(2):244–259, 1984. doi:10.1016/0022-0000(84)90068-0.
43
[62] S. D. Prestwich, F. Rossi, K. B. Venable, and T. Walsh. Constraint-based preferential optimization. In
M. M. Veloso and S. Kambhampati, editors, Proceedings of the 20th National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI 2005), pages 461–466, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, July 9–13 2005. URL https://www.aaai.
org/Papers/AAAI/2005/AAAI05-073.pdf.
[63] F. Ricci, L. Rokach, and B. Shapira, editors. Recommender Systems Handbook. Springer, New York, NY,
USA, 2nd edition, 2015.
[64] F. Rossi, K. B. Venable, and T. Walsh. mCP Nets: Representing and reasoning with preferences of
multiple agents. In D. L. McGuinness and G. Ferguson, editors, Proceedings of the 19th National Conference
on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2004), pages 729–734, San Jose, CA, USA, July 25–29 2004. URL
http://www.aaai.org/Library/AAAI/2004/aaai04-115.php.
[65] R. A. Russell. Planning with preferences using maximum satisfiability. UCAM-CL-TR 822, Comput-
ing Laboratory, University of Cambridge, UK, 2012. URL http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/
UCAM-CL-TR-822.html.
[66] D. Shaparau, M. Pistore, and P. Traverso. Contingent planning with goal preferences. In Y. Gil and
R. J. Mooney, editors, Proceedings of the 21st National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2006),
pages 927–935, Boston, MA, USA, July 16–20 2006. URL https://www.aaai.org/Papers/AAAI/2006/
AAAI06-146.pdf.
[67] S. Sikdar, S. Adali, and L. Xia. Optimal decision making with CP-nets and PCP-nets. In H. Aziz, J. P.
Dickerson, O. Lev, and N. Mattei, editors, Proceedings of the 4th Workshop on Exploring Beyond the Worst
Case In Computational Social Choice (EXPLORE 2017), pages 32–40, São Paulo, Brazil, May 9 2017. URL
http://www.explore-2017.preflib.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/paper_6.pdf.
[68] S. Sikdar, S. Adali, and L. Xia. Optimal decision making with CP-nets and PCP-nets (extended abstract).
In K. Larson, M. Winikoff, S. Das, and E. Durfee, editors, Proceedings of the 16th International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2017), pages 1736–1738, São Paulo, Brazil, May
8–12 2017. URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3091422.
[69] T. C. Son and E. Pontelli. Planning with preferences using logic programming. Theory and Practice of
Logic Programming, 6(5):559–607, 2006. doi:10.1017/S1471068406002717.
[70] J. Stein, I. Nunes, and E. Cirilo. Preference-based feature model configuration with multiple stakeholders.
In S. Gnesi, A. Fantechi, P. Heymans, J. Rubin, K. Czarnecki, and D. Dhungana, editors, Proceedings of the
18th International Software Product Line Conference (SPLC ‘14), pages 132–141, Florence, Italy, September
15–19 2014. URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2648511.2648525.
[71] L. J. Stockmeyer. The polynomial-time hierarchy. Theoretical Computer Science, 3(1):1–22, 1976.
doi:10.1016/0304-3975(76)90061-X.
[72] K. W. Wagner. Bounded query computations. In Proceedings of the 3rd IEEE Conference on Structure in
Complexity Theory (CoCo 1988), pages 260–277, Georgetown University, Washington D. C., USA, June
14–17 1988. URL http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=5286.
[73] K. W. Wagner. Bounded query classes. SIAM Journal on Computing, 19(5):833–846, 1990.
doi:10.1137/0219058.
[74] C. Wrathall. Complete sets and the polynomial-time hierarchy. Theoretical Computer Science, 3(1):23–33,
1976. doi:10.1016/0304-3975(76)90062-1.
[75] L. Xia, J. Lang, and M. Ying. Sequential voting rules and multiple elections paradoxes. In D. Samet,
editor, Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK
2007), pages 279–288, Brussels, Belgium, June 25–27 2007. URL http://www.tark.org/proceedings/
tark_jun25_07/p279-xia.pdf.
[76] L. Xia, J. Lang, and M. Ying. Strongly decomposable voting rules on multiattribute domains. In A. Howe
and R. C. Holte, editors, Proceedings of the 22nd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2007),
pages 776–781, Vancouver, BC, Canada, July 22–26 2007. URL http://www.aaai.org/Papers/AAAI/
2007/AAAI07-123.pdf.
44
[77] L. Xia, V. Conitzer, and J. Lang. Voting on multiattribute domains with cyclic preferential dependencies.
In D. Fox and C. P. Gomes, editors, Proceedings of the 23rd AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI 2008), pages 202–207, Chicago, IL, USA, July 13–17 2008. URL http://www.aaai.org/Papers/
AAAI/2008/AAAI08-032.pdf.
[78] L. Xia, V. Conitzer, and J. Lang. Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election
paradoxes. In Y. Shoham, Y. Chen, and T. Roughgarden, editors, Proceedings 12th ACM Conference
on Electronic Commerce (EC 2011), pages 179–188, San Jose, CA, USA, June 5–9 2011. URL http:
//dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=1993574.1993602.
45
